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POLITICAL SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
AFTER KNOX V SEIU, LOCAL 1000
Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinskyt
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, and other recent cases, the Supreme Court has given
organizations a newly robust First Amendment right to use the entity's money
in ways that stakeholders within the organization may find anathema and to
discriminate against employees and members in order to advance the expres--
sive interest of the entity. Yet, in 2012, the Court held in Knox v. Service
Employees International Union, Local 1000 that a labor union violates
the First Amendment rights of dissenters if it levies a special assessment for
political speech without first having dissenters opt in. The Court's jurispru-
dence on associational speech lacks any theory of when and why an organiza-
tion's speech violates the rights of dissenters. Nor does it consider what kinds
of internal organizational governance mechanisms are necessary to ensure a
fair allocation of speech protections between those who wish the organization
to promote one message and those who wish it to promote another. Moreover,
the majority in Knox casts First Amendment doubt on the validity of the
entire concept of collective bargaining by a union elected by a majority to
represent all employees in a bargaining unit of government employees. As
ballot measures in various states have been enacted or are pending that limit
the rights of unions to raise and spend money on politics in the name of
protecting dissident employees, a principled approach to the free speech rights
of unions, corporations, and other associations is ever more needed.
In this Article, we offer an approach to reconciling the First Amendment
expressive interests of organizations with the expressive interests of dissenting
stakeholders within them. We suggest an approach to resolving the inconsis-
tency between Citizens United, the union-dues cases, and the Court's other
compelled speech and associational speech jurisprudence. Contrary to the
prevailing wisdom, we suggest not that shareholders be given the opt-out (or
opt-in) rights of dissenting union employees but instead that unions be given
the same broad speech rights as corporations to finance political activity with
dues and fees paid by all employees.
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A striking number of recent, important constitutional cases de-
pend on analysis of the speech rights of entities-like corporations,
unions, and associations-and how they relate to the speech rights of
their members, especially their dissenting members. When the Su-
preme Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations have a
First Amendment right to make unlimited, independent campaign ex-
penditures, it dismissed in a few sentences the idea that the corporate
leadership's use of corporate resources on politics might infringe the
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rights of dissenting shareholders.' When the Court gave the Boy
Scouts a First Amendment right to discriminate against gays, it gave
the group's leadership power to advance their views at the expense of
those within the Boy Scouts who would prefer that the organization
promote tolerance, self-reliance, and wilderness conservation.2 Most
recently, some courts have suggested or held that closely held, for-
profit corporations have a First Amendment right to refuse to offer
employee health insurance policies that cover contraception regard-
less of whether the benefits package is paid for in part by employees;
these cases seek to give management the right to express their views
about contraception at the expense of women employees' rights to
comprehensive health care coverage. 3
Collectively, these recent cases have given organizations a newly
robust First Amendment right to use the entity's resources and money
in ways that stakeholders within the organization may find anathema
and to discriminate against employees and members in order to ad-
vance the expressive interests of the entity. In fact, in all of these
cases-and many others like them-the courts' focus has been almost
entirely on the free speech rights of the entity, and the courts have
given little, if any, weight to protecting members of the entity who
help pay for the entity's speech but disagree with its content.
There is one type of organization, however, where the Court has
held that the leadership's speech on behalf of the organization vio-
lates the First Amendment rights of dissenters: labor organizations.
The law has long been that both public sector and private sector un-
ions violate the First Amendment rights or the statutory rights of dis-
senting employees when they spend money from, the organization's
general treasury to advance a political message without giving the em-
1 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 911 (2010).
2 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
3 See, e.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting injunction pend-
ing appeal in favor of privately held corporation manufacturing vehicle parts against fed-
eral law requiring contraception coverage in employer-provided group health insurance
plan); Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (determining challenge
to contraceptive mandate not ripe for judicial review based on government's assertion that
it would not enforce the mandate against religiously affiliated entities such as the college
appellant); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (holding that for-
profit S-corporation engaged in heating and air conditioning equipment business has First
Amendment right to refuse to comply with provision of Affordable Care Act requiring
coverage of contraceptive care in employer-sponsored health insurance plan; facts do not
indicate what portion of benefits package, if any, is paid for by employees). But see, e.g.,
O'Brien v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, (E.D. Mo. 2012)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge to contraceptive mandate brought by privately held
limited liability company engaged in mining, processing, and distributing).
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ployees the chance to opt out of having their dues or fees support
political activity. 4
In June 2012, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local
1000, the Court dramatically expanded the rights of dissenting em-
ployees by holding that a union may make a special assessment to sup-
port political activities only if employees first opt in, and suggesting
that it is poised to require opt in for other union expenditures.5 Anti-
union employees in unionized workplaces thus enjoy a right to refuse
to subsidize organizational political activity that no shareholder or
corporate employee enjoys and that no nonprofit association member
enjoys. Thus, as Professor Benjamin Sachs has pointed out, while
under Citizens United corporations and unions are equally free "to
spend general treasury money on electoral politics," the Court has im-
posed "a restriction on unions' ability to fund these general treasuries
that corporations do not face."6
The dissimilar treatment of unions as compared to almost all
other organizations for purposes of the compelled speech restriction
on associational free speech rights cannot be justified by law or logic. 7
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has expanded the expressive rights
of organizations while ignoring the rights of dissenters in cases like
Citizens United and Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, and has simultaneously
narrowed the expressive rights of labor unions by expanding the
rights of dissenters in Knox, the dissonance between its two bodies of
law has grown sharper. The jurisprudence lacks any theory of when
and why an organization's speech violates the rights of dissenters. Nor
does it consider what kinds of internal organizational governance
mechanisms are necessary to ensure a fair allocation of speech protec-
tions between those who wish the organization to promote one mes-
sage and those who wish it to promote another. Ironically, although
4 Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUm. L. REV. 800, 895 & n.294 (2012).
5 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295-96 (2012).
6 Sachs, supra note 4, at 803.
7 We thus agree with Professor Sachs's analysis. See id. Our analysis differs from his in
three major respects. First, we address the Court's recent decision in Knox requiring opt in
rather than opt out; Professor Sachs's article was published before Knox was decided. Sec-
ond, our focus is broader: we argue not just for parity between stockholders and unionized
employees but for a paring back of the dissenting rights of union employees, expansion of
the rights of dissenting stockholders, and reconciling those two areas with the law gov-
erning the expressive interests of associations more generally. Third, we argue that opt out
rights for employees should be abolished rather than, as Professor Sachs argues, extended
to shareholders.
Other scholars have also criticized the inconsistency between the Court's treatment of
union political speech in Knox and corporate political speech in Citizens United See, e.g.,
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could Mean for Post-
Citizens United Shareholder Rights, 74 Morr. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2225851; Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United
and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2011).
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the law gives greater protection to employees to control the leader-
ship and decision making of their union than it gives to shareholders
or nonprofit association members, the Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence gives dissident shareholders fewer protections than dissi-
dent employees. As litigation,8 legislation, and ballot measures in
various states seek to impose new limits on the rights of unions to raise
and spend money on politics in the name of protecting dissident em-
ployees,9 a principled approach to the free speech rights of unions is
ever more needed.
In this Article, we show that the Court's recent expansion of the
rights of corporations to speak over the objections of dissenting mem-
bers cannot be squared with Knox's expansion of the right of dissent-
ers to restrict union speech. We explain why the conventional
distinction between unions and all other organizations-a voluntari-
ness notion that no one is forced to be a Boy Scout or own shares of a
corporation but people are forced to work in unionized workplaces-
is false. We also respond to the Knox dicta on the constitutionality of
majority unions' political speech by showing that requiring payment
of fees to support union activity in a regime of exclusive representa-
tion and majority rule does not infringe the rights of dissenting em-
ployees. We offer an approach to reconciling the First Amendment
expressive interests of organizations with the expressive interests of
dissenting stakeholders within them. While we are not the only schol-
ars to observe the inconsistency between Citizens United and the union-
8 See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that provision
of Illinois Public Labor Relations Act requiring home health aides paid by the state to pay
agency fees for union representation does not facially violate the First Amendment), peti-
tion for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 29, 2011) (No. 11-681). The petition for the writ of certiorari
asks the Court to rule that compulsory payment of agency fees to a union representing
government workers violates the First Amendment because it is "[c]ompelled [a]ssociation
to [p]etition [the] [g]overnment" that is "[a]ntithetical to the [p]rinciples of [d]emocratic
[p]luralism [p]rotected by the First Amendment." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25-29,
Harris, 656 F.3d 692 (No. 11-6811) 2011 WL 6019918, at *25-29. Harris is, perhaps, distin-
guishable from prior cases in that the workers in Harris are arguably contractors rather
than employees. See Harris, 656 F.3d at 697-98.
9 For example, although rejected by voters, Proposition 32 on the November 2012
California ballot would have required employees to opt in to union political spending and
prohibited unions from spending any money raised through payroll contribution. SeeJon
Healey, Proposition 32 Cost the GOP Far More than Mere Money, L.A. TIMEs (Nov. 9, 2012, 6:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-self-defeating-anti-union-
millionaires-20121108,0,7931625.story. Between 1992 and 2012, at least twelve efforts were
made in five states to qualify ballot measures to limit a union's use of payroll deductions
for political purposes. The measures qualified for the ballot eight times in three states,
three additional efforts failed to qualify, and one measure was removed from the ballot by
the courts. Id. Between 2009 and 2013, legislatures in sixteen states considered at least
forty measures specifically targeting the use of payroll deductions for political purposes.
Id. at 7. A comprehensive analysis of state payroll deduction measures is forthcoming:
Brian Olney, Paycheck Deception: When Government "Subsidies" Silence Political Speech, 4 UC
IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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dues cases, our broad frame includes the Court's general compelled
speech and associational speech jurisprudence, and we may be unique
in suggesting not that shareholders be given the opt-out (or opt-in)
rights of dissenting union employees but instead that unions be given
the same broad speech rights as corporations with no obligation to
allow opting out (or opting in).
Part I describes the First Amendment jurisprudence on the rights
of employees represented by unions with respect to union political
activities. We explain how Knox dramatically changed the law and ex-
panded the rights of dissenters at the expense of the rights of union
members and the union itself.
Part II examines the underlying First Amendment principles and
precedents. Knox and the cases that preceded it are based on concern
for protecting dissident government employees from compelled
speech. There are three separate strands of free speech doctrines that
underlie Knox- the need to prevent compelled speech, the speech
rights of associations, and the speech rights of government employees.
On close examination, the precedents in each of these areas do not
support the Court's holdings in Knox.
In Part III, we examine the implications of Knox for the speech
rights of unions and for the future of public sector collective bargain-
ing. The expansive dicta in the Court's opinion has potentially enor-
mous implications for the rights of public employees to bargain
collectively and to participate in politics through their unions. We
argue that courts continuing down the path opened in Knox would be
undesirable for society and for the First Amendment.
In Part IV, we suggest how courts should approach the difficult
question of reconciling the speech rights of entities with the rights of
dissenting individuals. We offer three conclusions. First, there is the
need for a new, clearer analytical framework that separates distinct
questions. Second, either the Court must accord corporate share-
holders the rights of dissent that the Court has given employees in
unionized workplaces or it must expand the free speech rights of un-
ions to be in parity with the rights of corporations and other associa-
tions. Finally, we suggest that the idea that an organization's political
spending constitutes compelled speech of dissidents is logically unsat-
isfying, and we therefore propose a new approach. Our approach rec-
onciles the rights of an organization to speak with the right of
stakeholders to be free from compelled speech or other harms to
their interests caused by the organization's speech. We argue that
both corporations and unions should be able to spend money in elec-
[Vol. 98:10231028
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tion campaigns without legal protection for dissenting shareholders
or members.' 0
The importance of the Court's inconsistency cannot be over-
stated. Together, Citizens United and Knox, decided just two years
apart, have significantly increased the political influence of corpora-
tions and have significantly decreased the political influence of un-
ions. These cases thus have enhanced the clout of organizations that
are thought to support the Republican Party while decreasing that of
those that tend to support Democrats." A close examination reveals
that the Court's inconsistencies in this area of law are unjustifiable
and a new regime is essential so that all entities are treated alike.
I
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF LABOR UNIONS
AND DISSENTING EMPLOYEES
Knox is the most recent decision in a line of cases that is well over
a half century old. Understanding it and its significance requires put-
ting it in this larger context.
A. The Origins and Development of the Law of Union Security
and Union Dues
Under federal and state labor law, a union selected by the major-
ity of employees in a bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit.12 Exclusivity of the union cho-
sen by the majority is a rule favored by employers that would otherwise
be confronted with demands from multiple different employee
groups and by employees who know there is strength only in num-
bers.13 As the Supreme Court said,
10 Whether their expenditures or contributions should be limited for reasons of pro-
tecting the political process-a notion that Citizens United largely rejected-is a separate
issue that we do not address. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
11 One analysis of data released by the Federal Election Commission in January 2013
shows that in the election cycle preceding the November 2012 cycle, Business (concededly
an amorphous category) made 59% of its total contributions to Republicans and 41% to
Democrats, while Labor made only 9% to Republicans and 91% to Democrats. 2012 Over-
view: Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties Super
PACs and Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORC, www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.
php (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
12 A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a single employer sharing a commu-
nity of interest regarding working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) ("Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such proposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. .); see Empo-
rium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
13 See Emporium Capwell 420 U.S. at 62, 67.
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[t]he designation of a single representative avoids the confusion
that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agree-
ments specifying different terms and conditions of employment. It
prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the
work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of col-
lectivization. It also frees the employer from the possibility of facing
conflicting demands from different unions, and permits the em-
ployer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that
are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations.14
Representation by a single union also enables the administration of
multi-employer health, retirement, and other benefit plans that are
essential to the social insurance system in industries like construction,
entertainment, and service in which employees work relatively short
periods for multiple employers.' 5
The represented employees need notjoin the union, but they are
still bound by its negotiating decisions, and they still have a claim on
its services. That the union is the exclusive representative means that
the union alone has the power and responsibility to negotiate with the
employer over terms of employment and to enforce the collective bar-
gaining agreement on behalf of every employee in the unit, not just
union members and not just those who voted for the union.16 Thus,
whether or not employees are union members, if they are represented
by a union, not only do they receive the wage and benefits gains asso-
ciated with union representation (typically about seventeen percent
more than earned by comparable nonunion workers' 7 ), they also have
the right to free legal assistance from the union in enforcing their
contractual and, in some cases, statutory rights against the employer.' 8
Not every employee will be a supporter of every choice the union
makes. If a union negotiates health benefits at the expense of a wage
increase, or agrees to wage concessions in exchange for a promise -to
avoid layoffs, or negotiates for promotions based on seniority rather
14 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220-21 (1977).
15 See What Is a Multiemployer Plan?, INT'L FOUND. EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, http://www.
ifebp.org/News/FeaturedTopics/Multiemployer/#3 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
16 Under the Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247
(2009), a union even has the responsibility in some circumstances to represent employees
who wish to bring statutory employment discrimination claims against the employer in a
grievance and arbitration proceeding. The union is not obligated to bring every statutory
claim, but it must act non-arbitrarily in deciding which statutory claims to bring, just as it
must act non-arbitrarily in deciding which contractual grievances to prosecute. See id. at
271.
17 See Sachs, supra note 4, at 811 & n.47 (collecting sources on the wage premium in
unionized workplaces).
18 See 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 271 (finding a union duty to represent employees in
arbitration of statutory claims when the agreement incorporates statutory rights); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 174 (1967) (finding a union duty to represent employees in contrac-
tual grievance procedure).
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than supervisory assessments of merit, some employees will be disap-
pointed. Unions must make trade-offs, and some employees may be-
come disaffected.' 9 The law tempers the power conferred by
exclusivity by requiring that the union negotiating and enforcing the
collective bargaining agreement must treat all represented workers
fairly and avoid arbitrary treatment or invidious discrimination. 2 0
In the long battle to improve working conditions through or-
ganizing, workers struggled to develop robust and financially secure
organizations capable of dealing with the large, professionally man-
aged, and well-financed corporations who were their adversaries and
negotiating partners.21 Union activists determined that automatic
dues payment and union security were necessary to prevent some em-
ployees from free riding on the wage gains and contractual protec-
tions secured by the union and to enable workers to be represented
and have their hard-won collective contracts administered by a compe-
tent staff.2 2 Unions, like the legal and medical professions today, also
thought that a monopoly on the practice of a certain trade or profes-
sion would protect the consumers of the product or service from poor
quality work.23 For all of these reasons, some labor organizations
(sometimes with and sometimes without the support of employers)
insisted on employment rules making it necessary to be a member of
the union, craft, or guild in order to work in a particular job.2 4 These
"closed shop" agreements were originally embraced by Congress in
the Wagner Act.25 Contractual requirements that employees belong
19 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("The complete satisfac-
tion of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.").
20 See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944); Matthew W.
Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 193-98
(1980); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty ofFair Representation, 27 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1992).
21 There are many books detailing the many legal and practical challenges workers
faced in developing strong unions. For some of the classics covering the period from the
mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, see DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE
HOUSE OF LABOR 1-8 (1987); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINs, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS 11-16
(1985). See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS (1960) (discussing labor movement
struggles pre- and post-Great Depression).
22 See Malin, supra note 20, at 146-47.
23 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-40 (1963) (considering state's argu-
ment that creating a monopoly in the provision of legal services protects consumers).
24 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
51, 57-61 (1990).
25 Section 8(3) as originally written prohibited "discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment .. . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion," but contained a proviso "[t]hat nothing in this Act ... or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organi-
zation . .. to require as a condition of employment membership therein ..... National
Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935). In the railroad industry,
where closed shops were uncommon, the Railway Labor Act of 1926 did not address the
1031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
to a union and pay dues to fund the services provided by the union
were common practice in many industries and raised no constitu-
tional questions because they were private employment agreements. 26
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 added a series of provisions creating
legal rights for employees and employers to resist unionization, in-
cluding a prohibition on the closed shop, but it preserved the ability
of unions and firms to agree to require employees to join the union
thirty days after becoming employed (the "union shop").27 In a union
shop, an employee can be fired for a loss of union membership only
when it results from a failure to pay union dues, but not from a failure
to abide by a union's bylaws or other rules.28 The Taft-Hartley amend-
ments were a product of congressional concern about the power of
unions to interrupt the operation of basic industries in the postwar
period and to coerce union members and other employees.2" But
Congress also understood the union concern that without some rule
requiring employees to pay dues to the union, nonunion employees
will get a "free ride" by sharing the benefits of what unions are able to
accomplish though collective bargaining without paying for them.30
The Taft-Hartley Act also added section 14(b), which allows states
the power to restrict or prohibit union security agreements altogether
as an exception to the general rule of preemption under the National
Labor Relations Act (NRLA).31 Although states differ in the extent to
which they utilize section 14(b) to restrict security agreements, every
state with a right-to-work law prohibits unions and employers from
conditioning employment on any type of union membership. In so
doing, state right-to-work laws-either explicitly or as interpreted judi-
cially-bar most union security agreements, including agency fee ar-
permissibility of closed shops where they existed. Union density was quite high on the
railroads, and union security agreements were rare because railroad hiring practices and
the difficulty of starting new nonunion railroad lines meant that employees had no reason
to fear the threat of low-wage, nonunion competition. See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL.,
LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 869 (2009); Victoria L. Bor & Harold Datz,
Union Security, in LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION 424-26 (William W. Osborne ed.,
2003).
26 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24, at 130-31.
27 The Taft-Hartley Act added to section 7 "the right of employees 'to refrain from
[concerted activities] except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment' as author-
ized in section 8(a) (3)." DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 25 at 866-72 (quoting Taft-Hart-
ley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)).
28 See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
29 On the history of section 14(b), see Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Misconception
of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of
American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 128-34 (2005).
30 See id.
31 Taft-Hardey Act, ch. 120, § 14(b), 61 Stat. 136, 151 (1947) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006)).
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rangements. 32 In right-to-work states, unions are still obligated by law
to provide services to all of the employees that they represent, but the
union cannot require employees to pay their fair share of the costs of
contract negotiation or administration.33 In right-to-work states, em-
ployees who wish to form a union are effectively forced to subsidize
the provision of the union benefits to coworkers who refuse to sup-
port the union. This also means that right-to-work laws effectively tax
the First Amendment activities of unions and their members by reduc-
ing the amount of money unions have to spend on First Amendment
activity. 34 Unions in some right-to-work states have experimented with
fee for service agreements. Although the union cannot charge fair
share fees in advance, some statutes and cases allow them to charge
for some services provided to individuals, such as filing grievances and
taking cases to arbitration.35 Even in states that do not bar union se-
32 As of 2012, twenty-three states have exercised this power. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-
Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections
and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 407, 428-31 (2012) (summarizing recent legislative developments). There have
been numerous efforts to extend the right-to-work regime nationally by introducing legisla-
tion in Congress to ban all union security arrangements. See, e.g., National Right-to-Work
Act, S. 504, 112th Cong. (2012). A business-funded nonprofit organization, the National
Right-to-Work Committee, and a legal defense foundation of the same name have pushed
for over fifty years to enact right-to-work legislation both at the state level and nationally.
See About NRTWC, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMiTrEE, www.nrtwc.org/about-2/ (last
visited Jan. 26, 2013). Those allied with the labor movement vigorously oppose the right-
to-work regime, arguing that workers in right-to-work states tend to earn less than workers
in other states. See Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through
NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DuKE L.J. 691, 701 & nn.58-59 (2007)
(reporting data showing lower union density in states with right-to-work laws and also re-
porting a study showing an increase in shareholder wealth after the passage of right-to-
work laws, an effect that was attributed to labor's weakened bargaining position); see also
Steven E. Abraham & Paula B. Voos, Right-to-Work Laws: New Evidence from the Stock Market,
67 S. ECON. J. 345, 358-59 (2000) (economic analysis showing firm owners anticipating
adoption of right-to-work law in Louisiana would increase their share of firm profits); Wil-
liam J. Moore, The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the Recent Litera-
ture, 19 J. LAB. RES. 445, 463-64 (1998) (reviewing literature on right-to-work laws and
concluding that these laws impact unionization, free riding, union success in NLRB elec-
tions, and state industrial development).
33 Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 327-29 (1953) (holding that union cannot
charge nonmembers a fee in a right-to-work state because such employees, though not
members or fee-payers, are nevertheless statutorily entitled to union representation); Bor
& Datz, supra note 25, at 518, 527.
34 This point has been made recently by Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective
Bargaining Distort Democracy? A Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ.
277 (2013).
35 See, e.g., Cone v. SEIU Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Nev. 2000) (holding that
union fee schedule for all nonmembers for grievance arbitration does not violate Nevada
right-to-work law and dismissing Board's contrary precedent because it inequitably "re-
quir[es] union members to shoulder the burden of costs associated with nonunion mem-
bers' individual grievance representation"); United Ass'n ofJourneymen Local Union No.
81, 237 N.L.R.B. 207, 209-11 (1978) (holding that union may charge a fee to nonmembers
for use of union hiring hall). But see State, Cnty. & Mun. Emp. Local 2384 v. City of Phx.,
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curity devices (that is, in non-right-to-work states), employers and un-
ions cannot constitutionally enforce an agreement requiring
employees to join the union; the most that a union can require is that
union-represented employees pay an "agency fee" for the union's ser-
vices in negotiating and administering the contract.3 6
The agency fee system was proposed to and rejected by the Su-
preme Court in 1956 in Railway Employees Department v. Hanson.37 In
Hanson, the National Right to Work Foundation argued that the Rail-
way Labor Act (RLA) was unconstitutional because it preempted a Ne-
braska right-to-work law and therefore compelled employees to
support unions.38 The RLA, unlike the NLRA, preempts state right-to-
work laws.39 RLA preemption was crucial to establish state action be-
cause otherwise the contract requiring employees to pay dues to the
union and the union's subsequent expenditure of dues might have
been considered to be simply a private agreement between a private
employer (the railroad) and nonprofit organization, the railway em-
ployees' union. The First Amendment, then, would have no
relevance.
The Supreme Court made two significant holdings in Hanson.
First, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the RLA's preemption
of state right-to-work laws was sufficient state action to subject the
union security agreement between the private union and the private
railroad to constitutional scrutiny.40 Second, the Court held that the
compelled subsidization of the employees' exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative did not violate the employees' First Amendment rights. Be-
cause there was no evidence in the case as to how the union spent
dues, the Court reserved the issue of whether the expenditure of dues
over the objection of some employees might in some cases "impair
freedom'of expression."41
142 P.3d 234, 235 (Ariz. 2006) (finding that fair share fees violate Arizona right-to-work
law); United Ass'n ofJourneymen Local Union No. 141 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257, 1261-62
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that fair share fees violate right-to-work laws of Arkansas, Florida,
Louisiana and Mississippi); Fla. Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Emp. Relations Comm'n, 346 So. 2d
551, 552-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that fair share fee violates Florida right-to-
work law); cf NLRB v. North Dakota, 504 F. Supp. 2d 750, 752 (D.N.D. 2007) (holding
state law requiring union to charge nonmembers for services is preempted by NLRA).
Under section 19 of the NLRA, enacted in 1974 and amended in 1980, an employee who
holds a conscientious objection to unions does not have to pay fees to a union but must
pay the same amount to another charity. See Bor & Datz, supra note 25, at 528-30.
36 See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
37 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
38 Id. at 228.
39 Id. at 231.
40 Id. at 232 ("If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made
pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded."). The ques-
tion of whether federal preemption of a state law governing a private contract constitutes
state action is discussed infra note 60 and accompanying text.
41 Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
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The Court reached the issue it reserved in Hanson in International
Ass'n ofMachinists v. Street.42 The Court emphasized the importance of
unions' role in "securing self-adjustment between the effectively or-
ganized railroads and the equally effective railroad unions and, to that
end, of establishing facilities for such self-adjustment by the railroad
community of its own industrial controversies . . ."43 The Court
noted that nonunion members "share in the benefits derived from
collective agreements negotiated by the railway labor unions but bear
no share of the cost of obtaining such benefits" 44 and found that the
RLA "contemplated compulsory unionism to force employees to share
the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and
the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes." 4 5 But, to
avoid the constitutional issue raised by the National Right to Work
Foundation, the Court held that Congress did not intend to force em-
ployees to subsidize the union's political speech. 46
The Court cautioned, however, that limits on the right of unions
to charge nonmember employees for political expenditures must not
be allowed to restrict the ability of the union to convey its own politi-
cal message:
[M]any of the expenditures involved in the present case are made
for the purpose of disseminating information as to candidates and
programs and publicizing the positions of the unions on them. As
to such expenditures an injunction would work a restraint on the
expression of political ideas which might be offensive to the First
Amendment. For the majority also has an interest in stating its
views without being silenced by the dissenters. To attain the appro-
priate reconciliation between majority and dissenting interests in
the area of political expression, we think the courts in administering
the Act should select remedies which protect both interests to the
maximum extent possible without undue impingement of one on
the other. 47
As explained below, this focus on protecting the speech rights of the
union vanished in subsequent cases.
The next major challenge to union security came in Abood v. De-
troit Board of Education, in which Michigan courts had held that the
state's public sector labor statute permitted an agency shop and al-
lowed unions to spend agency shop fees on political activities. 48 The
42 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
43 Id. at 760 (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 752-53 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
44 Id. at 762 (internal citations omitted).
45 Id. at 764.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 773.
48 431 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1977).
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Court therefore could not avoid the constitutional question through
statutory interpretation. The Court held that nonunion members can
be required to pay agency fees to support collective bargaining be-
cause they benefit from it, but they cannot be required to support
union political activities unrelated to contract negotiation and
administration. 49
The notion embraced in Street and Abood that contractually re-
quired union membership involved compelled speech in violation of
the First Amendment produced sharp dissent from some Justices. In
Street, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, thought that the
majority's constitutional avoidance analysis was wrongheaded. First,
there was no basis in fact for thinking that Congress had intended the
RLA to allow employees to opt out of union spending.50 Second, the
dissent saw no coerced speech in union activism. The employees re-
mained free to speak on all issues regardless of the union's position.
Plaintiffs here are in no way subjected to such suppression of their
true beliefs or sponsorship of views they do not hold. Nor are they
forced to join a sham organization which does not participate in
collective bargaining functions, but only serves as a conduit of funds
for ideological propaganda. ... No one's desire or power to speak
his mind is checked or curbed. The individual member may ex-
press his views in any public or private forum as freely as he could
before the union collected his dues.5 1
Justice Frankfurter also rejected the notion that union political
advocacy coerced dissenting employees in a way that union bargaining
or grievance processing did not.5 2 The line between political expres-
sion and contract negotiation, the dissenters insisted, was fictitious.
The dissent rejected the notion that a union serves its members only
at the bargaining table and in grievance arbitration, and not by advo-
cating in the legislature for improved working conditions.5 3 Unions
throughout American history pursued the interests of workers
49 Id. at 235-37. As Professor Martin Malin pointed out, the Court in Abood intro-
duced confusion into the law governing union dues by suggesting that compelled funding
of union political activity not only raised free speech issues but also issues of freedom of
association by funding speech with which employees disagreed as well as enforcing ideolog-
ical conformity. See Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 858 (1989). The conflation of free speech and free association contin-
ued in Knox. See discussion infra Part I.B.
50 Street, 367 U.S. at 801 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is a total absence in
the text, the context, the history and the purpose of the legislation under review of any
indication that Congress, in authorizing union-shop agreements, attributed to unions and
restricted them to an artificial, non-prevalent scope of activities in the expenditure of their
funds. An inference that Congress legislated regarding expenditure control in contradic-
tion to prevailing practices ought to be better founded than on complete silence.").
51 Id. at 805-06.
52 Id. at 814-15.
53 See id.
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through political channels as well as through bargaining, including
"compulsory education, an eight-hour day, employer tort liability, and
other social reforms." 54 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter observed, " [t]he
notion that economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Vic-
torian. . . . It is not true in life that political protection is irrelevant to,
and insulated from, economic interests. It is not true for industry or
finance. Neither is it true for labor."55
In 1988, the Court extended the architecture of dissenters' rights
to private sector unions and union security arrangements in Communi-
cations Workers v. Beck.56 Skipping over the constitutional avoidance
rationale, the Court based its decision on statutory interpretation.
When Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the Court rea-
soned, it intended to create the same union shop regime that the
Court invented as a matter of constitutional avoidance fourteen years
later in Street.57
Apart from the anachronism of assuming Congress intended
something that the Court only dreamed up years later, the problem
with the Court's analysis in Beck, as noted by Justice Blackmun in a
dissent joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, was that neither the
plain language of section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA nor its legislative his-
tory supported it. The statute expressly allows agreements that re-
quire employees to become union members as a condition of
employment in a workplace where they receive the benefits of union
representation, and nothing in section 8(a) (3) gives "any employee,
union member or not, the right to pay less than the full amount of
regular dues and initiation fees charged to all other bargaining-unit
employees."58 Moreover, as the dissent pointed out, nothing in the
statute "limits, or even addresses, the purposes to which a union may
devote the moneys collected pursuant to [a union security]
agreement."59
In sum, as we will discuss more fully below, the right of dissident
employees to refuse to support union political activities began as a
matter of constitutional avoidance in Street, although the argument for
state action is specious. In no other situation has federal statutory
preemption of state regulation of private sector employment relation-
54 Id. at 800.
55 Id. at 814-15.
56 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
57 Id. at 745-47.
58 Id. at 767 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 769. A critique of the Court's statutory interpretation in Beck has been per-
suasively made by Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24, at 54-55. Professor Mar-
tin Malin has noted that the Court's determination that the union security clause at issue
in Beck violated the duty of fair representation was inconsistent with its entire body of cases
on the duty of fair representation. Malin, supra note 20, at 152.
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ships created the state action necessary to give employees First
Amendment protections from employer discipline. 60 Nevertheless,
the Court extended the right to public sector employees in Abood,
where there is clearly government action but, as we explain below,
generally employees do not have First Amendment rights to make or
refrain from political speech. By the time the Court finally granted all
private sector employees a right to opt out of union political expendi-
tures in Beck,61 it lacked a plausible argument for doing so as a matter
of statutory language or legislative history-as even Justice Scalia
agreed in dissent 6 2- but clearly believed as a matter of policy that
employees should have the right to resist subsidizing union political
activities.63
The Court created an elaborate set of rules governing the opt-out
process. Unions must maintain a system for employees to challenge
the union's accounting and determination of dissenters' fair share of
chargeable expenses and must notify employees annually about the
system and allow employees to make annual objections.64 This is
called a Hudson notice.65 The Court also stipulated the kinds of ex-
penses that are and are not chargeable to objectors. 66 Objecting em-
60 If federal preemption of state laws regulating employment contracts renders en-
forcement of the affected provisions of the employment agreement state action, then the
Court's entire jurisprudence under the Federal Arbitration Act preempting state regula-
tion of arbitration agreements in employment contracts also renders such agreements state
action. Cf AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-53 (2011) (holding that
Federal Arbitration Act preempted a California state rule governing unconscionability of
class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 109 (2001) (construing section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act as exempting con-
tracts of employment of transportation workers but no other employment contracts from
Federal Arbitration Act's coverage). An employee fired for refusing to sign an agreement
waiving her right to bring a sexual harassment and retaliation suit in court would, on that
analysis, have a possible First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and perhaps even Sev-
enth Amendment claim against the private sector employer.
61 See Beck, 487 U.S. at 741-42.
62 Id. at 768 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
63 Professor Sachs has also noted the confusion in the Supreme Court's cases about
whether the opt out-rule is based on constitutional requirement, constitutional avoidance,
or statutory interpretation. Sachs, supra note 4, at 817.
64 Unions must provide an accounting of annual expenditures to enable dissenters to
challenge the union's determination of which expenses are chargeable. Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986). The system governing private sector workers
is described in Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 232-33 (1995).
65 See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 878 (1998) ("With the Hudson
notice, plus any additional information developed through reasonable discovery, an objec-
tor can be expected to point to the expenditures or classes of expenditures he or she finds
questionable.").
66 Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798, 802 (2009) (finding that litigation expenses are
chargeable if the subject of the litigation is chargeable); Miller, 535 U.S. at 877-79 (holding
that agency-fee objectors who have not agreed to a union's arbitration process may not be
required to exhaust arbitral remedy before challenging the union's calculation in federal
court); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991) (holding that local bar-
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ployees may be compelled to pay their fair share of "the expenses of
activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to imple-
ment or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative
of the employees in the bargaining unit."67 Under this standard, un-
ions may charge objecting employees for the costs of negotiating and
administering the collective bargaining agreement as well as the costs
associated with the union's national convention, the union's social ac-
tivities, certain litigation expenses, and the portions of the unions'
publications reporting on chargeable activities.68
In the 1980s and 1990s, in legislation and ballot initiatives, union
opponents began to assert that allowing employees to opt out of chal-
lenged expenditures was insufficient protection for dissenters. They
insisted that only a system requiring employees to opt in would pro-
tect dissenters against compelled speech.69 Some of these measures
were framed as or included in campaign finance reform measures.
One such initiative, Initiative 134, was adopted in 1992 in Washing-
ton. 70 It limited campaign expenditures and prohibited a labor or-
ganization from using fees collected from nonmembers "to make
contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a
political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individ-
ual."71 The law did not require corporations to secure shareholder
consent to make such expenditures. 72
A conservative legal organization brought a series of suits against
the Washington Education Association (WEA) challenging its political
expenditures and fundraising under Initiative 134.73 In one such suit,
gaining representative may charge objecting employees their pro rata share of costs associ-
ated with chargeable activities).
67 Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1984). Implement-
ing that standard, the Court adopted a three-part test for determining whether the ex-
penses are chargeable to dissenters: (1) whether they support "activities germane to
collective bargaining"; (2) whether they involve "additional interference with the First
Amendment interests of objecting employees" beyond that "already countenanced" by
union representation; and (3) if so, whether the additional interference is "nonetheless
adequately supported by a governmental interest." Id. at 455-56.
68 Id. at 448-54; see also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519 (reiterating test and elaborating on
chargeability analysis).
69 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 38-39, Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177
(2007) (No. 05-1589) (characterizing union opt-in requirement as a minimal protection
for dissenters' First Amendment rights).
70 See id. at 5.
71 WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17A.500 (2012).
72 Interestingly, even some who had initially supported Initiative 134 later concluded
that its prohibitions on campaign expenditures had unintended consequences and failed
"to limit the influence of special interests." Editorial, Initiative 134: Is This What We Voted
for?, SEATT-rLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/
?date=19931014&slug=1725945.
73 See State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d
352, 355 (Wash. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 177 (2007); State ex rel Evergreen Freedom
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the Washington Supreme Court held that the state law unconstitution-
ally infringed the right of the WEA to engage in political activity. 7 4 In
Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n, the Supreme Court reversed
the Washington Supreme Court and upheld the statute in a five-to-
four decision with a majority opinion by Justice Scalia.75 The Court
reasoned that the statute did not restrict the union's speech but sim-
ply limited "the union's extraordinary state entitlement to acquire and
spend other people's money."76 The Court made clear that the opt-out
regime it had devised in prior cases was sufficient to protect dissenters
but that states could give dissenting employees more rights than the
Court had.7 7
B. Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000
Knox goes beyond anything the Court previously held by conclud-
ing that the First Amendment requires an opt-in regime with respect
to certain forms of union fees. In other words, what the Court in Dav-
enport said that a state could do by law, the Court in Knox found to be a
constitutional requirement. Moreover the Court's majority suggested
in dicta that its reasoning would apply not only to the special assess-
ment at issue in that case but might also apply to all union fundraising
from represented employees, including annual dues and fees.
The Knox decision is the result of an effort by then California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to use the initiative process to sig-
nificantly decrease the influence of public employee unions in that
state. In June 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger called for a special
election to consider various ballot measures, including one (Proposi-
tion 75) that would have required unions to use an opt-in system as in
Davenport and another (Proposition 76) that would have given the gov-
ernor the unilateral power to reduce state appropriations for public
sector employee compensation.78 In response, the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU), which represents many public employee
unions in California, joined a coalition of labor organizations in
launching a campaign to defeat the ballot measures. To fund the
Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 999 P.2d 602, 604-05 (Wash. 2000); State ex rel. Evergreen
Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 49 P.3d 894, 899-900 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
74 See Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d at 364-65.
75 551 U.S. 177, 191-92 (2007).
76 Id. at 187.
77 Id. at 185. The Supreme Court also held that payroll deduction-the system that
unions have long insisted upon as necessary to enable them to exercise their rights to
bargain and to engage in other expressive activities-is not constitutionally protected.
Thus, when Idaho decided to weaken unions by prohibiting the collection of union dues
and fees through payroll deduction, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge that the stat-
ute violated the union's First Amendment rights. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S.
353, 364 (2009).
78 See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012).
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campaign, the SEIU proposed to adopt an emergency temporary as-
sessment of one quarter of one percent of an employee's wage.79 For
an employee earning ten dollars an hour, that would amount to two
and a half cents an hour or one dollar a week. The assessment lasted
for eight months before the next opt-out opportunity.80 In other
words, an employee who worked forty hours every week at ten dollars
an hour and paid the entire assessment before being allowed to opt
out would have paid thirty-two dollars. Because it turned out that only
about thirty percent of the union's total expenditures, including the
special assessment, were nonchargeable in the 2005-2006 year, the
employee would be entitled to recoup about ten dollars.81
Although the annual period for registering objections to union
spending under Hudson82 had expired, the SEIU sent a letter to its
members and fee payers notifying them of the temporary fee increase
and explaining the need for it. The union did not provide a new Hud-
son notice informing employees of their right to opt out, nor did it
provide a new opportunity to opt out.8 3 However, once dissenters
complained, the union allowed its fee payers (those who had filed ob-
jections pursuant to the last Hudson notice), per the last set of calcula-
tions done under Hudson to determine the chargeability of expenses
in the prior year, to pay only fifty-six percent of the temporary
increase.84
As it happened, the SEIU's nonchargeable expenditures were
lower in the fiscal year that began in July 2005 than they had been in
the year ending June 2005. Only thirty-one percent of its expendi-
tures were nonchargeable, as compared to forty-four percent in the
prior year.85 Hence, the dissenters ended up being charged less, in-
cluding the emergency temporary assessment, than was their fair
share of the union's annual expenses. Thus, on the facts of the case,
none of the plaintiffs was actually forced to subsidize any political speech; in-
deed, they paid less than their share of the contract negotiation and
administration expenses. In other words, union members were forced
to subsidize the nonmembers' share of the union's contract adminis-
tration expenses.
79 Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010),
rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
80 Id.
81 As explained above, chargeable expenses are those deemed to be for the collective
bargaining activities, which nonmembers must pay for, while nonchargeable expenses are
those for political activities, which nonmembers do not need to pay for. See supra notes
64-68.
82 Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986); see supra
text accompanying notes 63-67.
83 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2286.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 2301 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Nevertheless, a class of employees represented by the National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation filed suit challenging the
temporary assessment and, in particular, the SEIU's failure to issue a
separate Hudson notice in July-August 2005 and to provide an addi-
tional opportunity for employees to opt out.86 The district court, with-
out oral argument and in an unpublished opinion, granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the union intended to use the
entire temporary assessment for nonchargeable expenses.87 It or-
dered the union to issue a new Hudson notice and to provide those
who objected with a full refund of their contributions to the tempo-
rary assessment. 8
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a split decision, holding that it was
not necessary to issue a new Hudson notice for a midyear special assess-
ment.89 The court held that the union's procedure, including its let-
ter to all employees notifying them of the nature and purpose of the
assessment and its decision to charge anyone who had previously ob-
jected according to the prior year's chargeability percentage, accom-
modated the First Amendment rights of union employees to engage
in political fundraising and the First Amendment rights of the nonun-
ion employees to object.90
The dissenting employees sought and obtained certiorari on two
questions: (1) whether a Hudson notice is required for a "special
union assessment intended solely for political and ideological expend-
itures", and (2) whether payment of agency fees may be compelled to
fund "political expenditures for ballot measures."91 The briefing both
on the petition for certiorari and on the merits focused on whether a
Hudson notice should be required for a midyear special assessment;
whether the union's statement that the assessment would be used to
defeat Propositions 75 and 76 meant that the entire assessment was
not chargeable and, if not, how to determine the proportion of
chargeable expenses in the assessment; and whether to treat those
who had opted out in response to the June 2005 Hudson notice differ-
ently from those who had not.9 2
86 Plaintiffs' Verified Class Action Complaint at 10, Knox v. Westly, No. 2:05-cv-02198-
MCE-KJM, 2008 WL 850128 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).
87 Knox 2008 WL 850128, at *7, *12.
88 Id. at *12.
89 Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2010),
rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
90 Id. at 1120.
91 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132
S. Ct. 2277 (2012) (No. 10-1121), 2011 WL 882172, at *i.
92 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 91, at 16-27; Petitioners' Reply Brief
on the Merits at 8-11, Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No. 10-1121), 2011 WL 6468686, at *8-11;
Brief for Petitioners at 8-11, Knox 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No. 10-1121), 2011 WL 4100440, at
*8-11.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.95 In a five-to-two-
to-two decision, the majority did not simply decide the issue presented
and hold that a separate Hudson notice was required, along with a new
opportunity to opt out. Nor did the majority hold that the
chargeability of the temporary assessment could not be determined
using the prior year's formula. Instead, in a broad opinion by Justice
Alito, the Court held that any special assessment or dues increase may
be levied only after issuing a fresh Hudson notice and only on those
employees who opt in.94 As Justice Sotomayor's concurrence and Justice
Breyer's dissent both pointed out, the question of whether to switch
from an opt out-system to an opt-in system was not briefed or argued
in the case or discussed in the courts below.95
After two paragraphs of quotations and string cites of cases on the
importance of the First Amendment freedoms of speech and associa-
tion, and a short discussion of a case which found unconstitutional a
federal statute requiring mushroom handlers to pay assessments to
promote mushroom sales,96 Justice Alito's opinion began by casting
into doubt the constitutionality of mandatory payment of fees to pub-
lic sector unions:
Because a public-sector union takes many positions during collec-
tive bargaining that have powerful political and civic consequences,
the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled speech and as-
sociation that imposes a "significant impingement on First Amend-
ment rights." Our cases to date have tolerated this "impingement,"
and we do not revisit today whether the Court's former cases have
given adequate recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at
stake.97
The opinion then noted the justification for unions charging non-
members for services-to prevent free riding on the unions' efforts-
but immediately cautioned that "[s]uch free-rider arguments, how-
ever, are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objec-
tions."98 The majority asserted that the free rider justification for
compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues "represents
93 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 2298 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2288-89 (discussing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405
(2001)). In its discussion of United Foods, however, the majority entirely overlooked its own
precedent upholding the validity of another statutory regime requiring tree fruit produc-
ers to contribute to an advertising scheme. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S.
457 (1997). For further discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes
159-173.
97 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry.,




something of an anomaly-one that we have found to be justified by
the interest in furthering 'labor peace."' 99
The majority began its analysis of opt-out and opt-in regimes for
assessing fees by noting that the long-settled opt-out rule "represents a
remarkable boon for unions," and that "[c]ourts 'do not presume ac-
quiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."' 100 The opinion then
posed a series of rhetorical questions doubting the validity of opt out:
"[W]hat is the justification for putting the burden on the nonmember
to opt out of making such a payment? . .. And isn't it likely that most
employees who choose not to join the union that represents their bar-
gaining unit prefer not to pay the full amount of union dues?"10
Rather than discussing the possible answers to its questions, the opin-
ion then asserted that "acceptance of the opt-out approach appears to
have come about more as a historical accident than through the care-
ful application of First Amendment principles" 0 2 and criticized Street
for failing to consider the constitutional implications of an opt-out
requirement. 103 In its final sentence before turning to the facts of the
case, the majority ominously asserted that the Court's prior cases au-
thorizing the opt-out system "approach, if they do not cross, the limit
of what the First Amendment can tolerate."10 4
Regarding the union's failure to provide a Hudson notice for the
special assessment, the majority opinion posited that some employees
who did not object to paying full dues in June might have chosen in
August not to support the SEIU's political objectives. 05 The majority
particularly criticized the union for failing to require opt in for money
spent to oppose Proposition 75, which if adopted, would have re-
quired an opt-in regime. In rejecting the union's contention that the
next year's Hudson notice would have given objecting employees the
chance to recoup whatever they had contributed to the prior year's
nonchargeable expenses, the majority insisted that "even a full refund
would not undo the violation of First Amendment rights. . . . [F] or
nonmembers who disagreed with the SEIU's electoral objectives, a re-
fund provided after the union's objectives had already been achieved
would be cold comfort." 06 In a footnote, the majority rejected the
idea that a new Hudson notice should be required only when a special
99 Id. at 2290 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303
(1986)).
100 Id. (quoting College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,




104 Id. at 2291.
105 Id. at 2292.
106 Id. at 2292-93.
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assessment is imposed for political purposes: "[A] union's money is
fungible, so even if the new fee were spent entirely for nonpolitical
activities, it would free up other funds to be spent for political
purposes." 07
The Court also rejected the use of the prior year's determination
of the proportion of chargeable expenses for a special assessment,
finding it unreasonable to assume that the same proportion of a spe-
cial assessment will be chargeable as were the expenses for the entire
previous year.108 The Court also found it infeasible to devise a new
breakdown for chargeable and nonchargeable expenses for a special
assessment because there would be no reason to trust the union's as-
sertion about what an assessment would be used for.109 The Court
concluded:
[B]y allowing unions to collect any fees from nonmembers and by
permitting unions to use opt-out rather than opt-in schemes when
annual dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon
the First Amendment rights of nonmembers. In the new situation
presented here, we see no justification for any further impinge-
ment. . . . Therefore, when a public-sector union imposes a special
assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson
notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without
their affirmative consent.110
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the
judgment on the grounds that unions must issue a new Hudson notice
for a special assessment that is intended for political activities, that
employees should be given the opportunity to opt out, and that the
union should not be able to collect nonchargeable expenses from
those who previously objected."' Their opinion criticized the major-
ity for deciding the opt-in issue, which had not been briefed or argued
in the case. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, the petitioners' briefs
never even mentioned opt in.112 The concurring opinion also
pointed out the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the Court's
holding: Is opt in required for any special assessment, even one to
fund indisputably chargeable activities? If opt out still applies to spe-
cial assessments intended to fund a mix of chargeable and noncharge-
able activities, may nonmembers opt out of the entire assessment or
only the nonchargeable portion? What process must unions use to
determine whether nonmembers have to pay anything?"13 Justice
107 Id. at 2293 n.6.
108 Id. at 2294.
109 Id. at 2294-95.
110 Id. at 2295-96 (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 2298 n.2.
11s Id. at 2298-99.
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Sotomayor's opinion also sharply criticized the breadth of the major-
ity's dicta casting doubt on the constitutionality of the opt-out rule for
regular union dues.114
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented. Justice Breyer
explained the difficulty of applying the Hudson rule to allow dissenters
to opt out of a portion of dues in the context of midyear assessments.
Noting that no party in the case had challenged the constitutionality
of the Hudson system allowing opt out based on an audit of the prior
year's expenses, the dissent explained that if the regular dues system is
not unconstitutional, the special assessment is not either." 5 The fair-
est and most efficient way to administer a system that allows dissenters
to avoid funding political expenses is to rely on annual audits of past
years because one cannot audit future expenses and any other system
is fraught with problems and is no more likely to protect dissenters
than the audit system.' 16 A once-a-year system for registering objec-
tions balances the rights of dissenters against the administrative bur-
den and expense that would accompany allowing employees to object
to paying full dues every quarter or every month." 7 The dissent
noted that the majority did not explain why new dissenters could not
be protected by being allowed simply to withhold the same forty-four
percent for nonchargeable expenditures that those who had objected
in June could withhold.118 The dissent also noted that not even a
"temporary constitutional harm" had been done to those who had not
filed an objection in response to the June 2005 Hudson notice and
thus had to pay the full special assessment because the union's total
chargeable expenses in 2005-2006 were larger than in 2004-2005, so
dissenters actually paid less than their fair share."19
Finally, Justice Breyer's dissent echoed Justice Sotomayor's criti-
cism of the majority's adoption of an opt-in rule that no party had
advocated, particularly since "each reason the Court offers in support
of its 'opt-in' conclusion seems in logic to apply, not just to special
assessments, but to ordinary yearly fee charges as well."1 2 0 As Breyer
noted, an "ongoing, intense political debate" across the country con-
114 Id. at 2299 ("To cast serious doubt on longstanding precedent is a step we histori-
cally take only with the greatest caution and reticence. To do so, as the majority does ... is
both unfair and unwise.").
"15 Id. at 2302 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2301-03.
117 Id. at 2301-02 ("This kind of basic administrative system is imperfect[, but it] ...
enjoys an offsetting administrative virtue. . . . It . .. gives workers reliable information. It
gives workers advance notice of next year's payable charge. It gives nonmembers a 'reason-
ably prompt' opportunity to object.") (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1. v. Hud-
son, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986)).
118 Id. at 2305.
119 Id. at 2302.
120 Id. at 2306.
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cerns "whether, the extent to which, and the circumstances under
which a union that represents nonmembers in collective bargaining
can require those nonmembers to help pay for the union's (constitu-
tionally chargeable) collective-bargaining expenses." 121 Although, as
the dissent noted, the Court held in Davenport that states can adopt
statutes shifting from opt out to opt in, the Court had never said that
the Constitution compels it. "There is no good reason for the Court
suddenly to enter the debate, much less now to decide that the Consti-
tution resolves it."' 22
At the very least then, Knox is significant in that it is the first time
the Supreme Court has said that an opt-out system is not sufficient to
protect nonunion employees from compelled speech and that an opt-
in regime is constitutionally required. The broad language of the
Court's majority suggests that five Justices may not be content to limit
their new rule to special assessments but rather are poised to say that
opt in is always constitutionally required. As explained below the
most disturbing dicta in the Court's opinion calls into question the
constitutionality of collective bargaining based on exclusive represen-
tation and majority rule.123
II
THE UNDERLYING FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES:
COMPELLED SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION,
AND THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Knox and the cases concerning the rights of nonunion members
that preceded it involve three interrelated strands of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence: the right to be free from compelled speech, the
expressive rights of associations, and the speech rights of government
employees. As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court's majority in
Knox found that to avoid compelled speech, unions and employers
cannot agree to any contract except one that allows nonunion mem-
bers to opt into supporting the special assessment.124 In doing so, the
Court gave no apparent weight to the right of the association or its
majority to be able to govern itself or participate effectively in the po-
litical process. The Court treated the law as to each of these strands of
First Amendment jurisprudence as clear and settled, when in reality
each is confused.
An examination of First Amendment principles shows that the
Court's decision in Knox cannot be the result of following precedent.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2307.
123 See infra Part IV.
124 See supra notes 93-110.
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Indeed, the Court's decision in Knox is inconsistent with major, prior
free speech decisions. Moreover, this examination of the underlying
free speech principles demonstrates the need for a reconceptualiza-
tion as to when forced speech occurs and violates the First Amend-
ment and as to how the speech rights of an entity are to be balanced
against the interests of its dissenting members.
A. Compelled Speech
The Court has long been inconsistent in deciding what consti-
tutes compelled speech, when forcing the use of private property for
speech is compelled speech, and when mandatory financial contribu-
tions-the issue in Knox-are compelled speech.
1. What Constitutes Compelled Speech?
The initial Supreme Court case concerning compelled speech
was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which declared
unconstitutional a state law that required that children salute the
flag.125 justice RobertJackson, writing for the Court, famously said:
[T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind. . . . If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.126
The Court followed this principle in other cases, such as Wooley v.
Maynard, where it ruled that an individual could not be punished for
blocking out the portion of his automobile license plate that con-
tained the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die."1 2 7 The
Court said that
the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amend-
ment ... includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.... The right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
broader concept of "individual freedom of mind."1 28
Both Barnette and Wooley involved actual compulsion to speak or
to display a message. Knox, of course, involved neither. And it is nota-
ble, in the context of Knox, that the Supreme Court found in both
Barnette and Wooley that the First Amendment simply required that
people be able to opt out. In Barnette, the Supreme Court did not
125 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
126 Id. at 633, 642.
127 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
128 Id. at 714 (citation omitted) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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prevent schools from beginning each day with a flag salute; it simply
said that children could opt out and not participate. In Wooley, the
Court said that those who object to "Live Free or Die" on their license
plate could opt out by putting tape over it. The Court did not require
that New Hampshire have those who wanted the phrase on their li-
cense plates make a special effort to get it.
Apart from the rare law, like that in Barnette, that forces someone
to utter words, the Court has not been consistent in deciding whether
there is compelled speech when a person or entity is forced to convey
a message. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc. (FAIR), the Court rejected a claim that requiring universities to
allow military recruiters equal access to campus interviewing as a con-
dition for receipt of federal funds was impermissible compelled
speech.'12 9 Most law schools refused to allow the United States military
to use campus facilities for recruiting because they refused permission
to all discriminatory employers to recruit, and they believed that al-
lowing use of the facilities would send a message to students that they
endorsed the military's policy of excluding gays and lesbians.,""
When Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, which denied fed-
eral funding to universities that excluded the military from campus
facilities, several law schools asserted a First Amendment right to re-
fuse to condone sexual orientation discrimination by employers.' 3 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly forced colleges and uni-
versities to express support for a policy of which they disapproved.' 3 2
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument and stated:
The Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools may
say nor requires them to say anything. Law schools remain free
under the statute to express whatever views they may have on the
military's congressionally mandated employment policy, all the
while retaining eligibility for federal funds. As a general matter, the
Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what
law schools must do--afford equal access to military recruiters-not
what they may or may not say.' 9
But this is far too facile a distinction, especially when compared
to Knox. In Knox and the cases that preceded it, the Court believed
that spending money to facilitate a third person expressing a message
constituted compelled speech.134 But in FAIR, the Court insisted that
129 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006).
1'0 See id. at 52-53.
131 See id.
132 See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 236
(3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
133 FAIR 547 U.S. at 60 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
134 See supra notes 42-49, 97.
1049
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
expending money to enable a third party to convey a message is not
compelled speech because one remains free to express whatever views
one may have on the matter in question.' 3 5 The latter, of course, was
the position that Justice Frankfurter took in his dissent in Street. pay-
ment of union dues is not compelled speech because dissident em-
ployees retain the right to express their own views.' 3 6
The special assessment in Knox, in the words of FAIR, regulated
conduct, not speech; it affected what nonmembers must do (pay
money), not what they may or may not say. The Court in FAIR was
unconcerned about law schools being forced to expend resources to
facilitate the military's recruiting on campus even though there was
no opt out, while the Court in Knox focused entirely on nonmembers
being forced to expend resources even though there was an opt out
available.
2. When Is the Compelled Use of Private Property Impermissible?
The Court has also considered compelled speech under the First
Amendment when the government forces people to use their prop-
erty for speech by others. The cases in this area are also difficult to
reconcile.
In some instances, the Court has held that the First Amendment
is violated if the government forces owners to make their property
available for expressive purposes. For example, in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated a
state law that required newspapers to provide space to political candi-
dates who had been verbally attacked in print.13 7 The Court empha-
sized that the freedom of the press gave to the newspaper the right to
decide what was included or excluded.'3 8
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California, the Court declared unconstitutional a utility commission
regulation that required that a private utility company include in its
135 See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 60. Nor can it be asserted, under the Supreme Court's prece-
dents at least, that maintaining or refusing to maintain a discriminatory employment or
membership policy is not a form of First Amendment expression. The Court in Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale expressly held that the Boy Scouts have a First Amendment right to ex-
press a message condemning homosexuality by discriminating against gays in employment
and membership. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). If the Boy Scouts have a First Amendment
right to express that message by discriminating in employment, it is hard to see why law
schools do not have the same First Amendment right to express the opposite message by
refusing to discriminate or to allow their students to be the victims of discrimination.
136 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 805-06 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
137 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
138 See id. at 258. The Court, however, allowed this as to the broadcast media. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1969).
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billing envelopes materials prepared by a public interest group.'" Be-
cause utilities enjoy a monopoly on the provision of services, they en-
joy a monopoly on the ability to send a bill each month that their
customers must open and read. The utility commission sought to pro-
vide a more balanced presentation of views on energy issues; the pub-
lic interest group's statements were to be a counterpoint to the
statements by the utility companies. 401 The Court found that such
compelled access violated the First Amendment. Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the Court, said that " [c]ompelled access like that ordered in
this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and
forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they
do not set."' '
In contrast, in other cases the Court has found no compelled
speech when an entity is forced to use its property or resources to
convey a message with which it disagrees. In PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins, shopping center owners argued that their First Amendment
rights were violated by a California Supreme Court ruling that protes-
tors had a right to use their property for speech under the state consti-
tution. 14 2 The shopping center owners specifically invoked Wooley v.
Maynard and said that forcing them to allow speech was impermissible
coerced expression. 143 The Supreme Court disagreed and found no
violation of the First Amendment. The Court expressly distinguished
Wooley and explained that the shopping center is
not limited to the personal use of appellants[,] ... [but] is instead a
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as
they please. The views expressed by members of the public in pass-
ing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not
likely be identified with those of the owner.144
Moreover, the Court said that "no specific message is dictated by the
State to be displayed on appellants' property. . . . [A]ppellants can
expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting
signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand."1 45
It is difficult to reconcile PruneYard with Pacific Gas & Electric. The
Court's asserted distinction-that the owners in PruneYard had not ob-
jected to the particular message being conveyed as they had in Pacific
Gas & Electric-is questionable. The shopping center owners wanted
139 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986).
140 See id. at 12-13 & n.9.
141 Id. at 9.
142 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The Supreme Court previously had held that there is no First
Amendment right of access to privately owned shopping centers for speech purposes.
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
143 See Robins, 447 U.S. at 85-87.




to exclude the speakers from using their property enough to litigate
the case to the Supreme Court. If there is a right of private property
owners to avoid compelled use of their property, their right to do this
should not depend on the content of their views relative to the
demonstrators'.
There is a real tension between Knox and the Court's decision in
PruneYard. In the latter, the Court was unconcerned about property
owners being forced by state law to support views they oppose, but in
Knox, the Court's decision was based entirely on not allowing state law
to be used to require nonunion members to support political activities
they oppose.
3. When Are Compelled Contributions a Violation of the First
Amendment?
As explained in Part I, Knox holds that it violated the First
Amendment for a union to specially assess nonmembers for political
activities without nonmembers having to opt into supporting them.' 14
But even in the area of compelled contributions, the Court has been
markedly inconsistent in deciding whether there is a First Amend-
ment violation.
As explained in Part I, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the
Court said that the nonmembers of a union could be required by con-
tract to pay a charge to subsidize the collective bargaining activities of
the union but that it violated the First Amendment to require the
nonmembers to pay for ideological causes with which they dis-
agreed.' 4 7 The Court said that the "heart of the First Amendment is
the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and
that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and
his conscience rather than coerced by the State."' 4 8
The Court reaffirmed and applied Abood in Keller v. State Bar of
California.'W1 The Court said that the Bar could use compulsory dues
only if the dues were "reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulat-
ing the legal profession or 'improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people of the State."'15o The Court explained that
the Bar could collect dues from all members to pay for bar-related
activities. But the Court added:
Compulsory dues may not be expended to endorse or advance a
gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at the other end of
the spectrum petitioners have no valid constitutional objection to
146 See supra Part I.B.
147 See supra Part I.A.
148 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Edic., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
141) 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
150 Id. at 14 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
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their compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with dis-
ciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the
profession.15'
In sharp contrast to Abood and Keller, the Court upheld
mandatory student activity fees at public universities. In Board of Re-
gents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, the Court unani-
mously upheld the permissibility of requiring college students to pay
money each semester to a fund that subsidizes student activities.15 2
Conservative University of Wisconsin law students challenged their
having to pay the university's student activities fee, part of which was
given to groups with which they disagreed. 53 They argued under
Abood and Keller that this was forced association that violated their First
Amendment rights.154
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge. The Court empha-
sized the importance of student activity fees in universities in provid-
ing a diversity of speakers and events.1 55 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, said that such a fee is constitutional so long as the univer-
sity distributes the funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner.'56 In this
case, the students had stipulated as to the viewpoint-neutral disburse-
ment of the funds, so no First Amendment violation was found.'57
Southworth cannot be easily reconciled with Abood and Keller. In
all three cases, there were compelled contributions. In all three cases,
the challengers objected that their money was being spent to support
political activities with which they disagreed. The difference is that in
Southworth, the Court upheld the compelled expenditures because it
accepted the importance of having student activity fees and the right
of universities to convey messages with which some students disagree.
In Abood and Keller, by contrast, the Court did not find a sufficiently
important interest in requiring support for the political activities of a
union or a state bar. In other words, the distinction is not in whether
there was compelled speech but in whether it was sufficiently justified
in the Court's view. Relatedly, when applying Keller, courts have been
inconsistent in drawing the line between nonchargeable political ac-
tivities and other expenses. A state bar may charge dissenting mem-
bers to fund a public relations campaign focusing on improving the
reputation of lawyers generally, but a union may not charge dissenting
employees to fund a similar campaign focusing on explaining to em-
ployees and to the general public the advantages of union representa-
151 Id. at 16.
152 529 U.S. 217, 220-21 (2000).
153 Id. at 221.
154 Id. at 227-28.
155 Id.




tion for teachers.158 Other than that some courts consider the poor
reputation of lawyers to be a more pressing problem than public skep-
ticism of teachers' unions, there is no basis to distinguish why one is
not unconstitutional compelled speech and the other one is.
One other area where the Court has considered mandatory as-
sessments and again been inconsistent is in the context of government
requirements that agricultural producers contribute to funds for
product advertising. In two decisions, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & El-
liottl59 and United States v. United Foods, Inc.,16 0 the Court came to op-
posite conclusions about the constitutionality of such programs. In
Glickman, the Court upheld regulations issued pursuant to the Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 that required fruit produc-
ers to contribute funds to pay for generic advertising for fruit.161
Wileman Brothers & Elliott, California fruit producers, challenged the
regulation as impermissible compelled speech and association.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, rejected the chal-
lenge and upheld the federal law. Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, said that "requiring respondents to pay the assessments cannot
be said to engender any crisis of conscience. None of the advertising
in this record promotes any particular message other than encourag-
ing consumers to buy California tree fruit." 1 6 2 justice Stevens said
that neither the challengers' desire to differentiate their own product
nor their belief that the money was not being well spent provided a
basis for a First Amendment violation.163
But four years later, in United States v. United Foods, Inc., the Court
came to the opposite conclusion and invalidated the requirement for
mandatory assessments for product advertising contained in the
Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act.16 4
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a Mush-
room Council composed of mushroom producers and importers.16 5
The council can impose mandatory assessments on handlers of fresh
158 Compare Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991) (holding that
public relations efforts designed to bolster the reputation of teachers are not chargeable),
with Kingstad v. State Bar of Wis., 622 F.3d 708, 719 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that state
bar's PR campaign is chargeable even though Lehnert held a union PR campaign is not
because building public confidence in the organized bar is "very different" from building
confidence in teachers or their union).
159 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
160 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
161 521 U.S. at 463, 476-77.
162 Id. at 472.
163 Id. at 472-73.
164 533 U.S. at 408-09.
165 Id. at 408.
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mushrooms to be used for generic advertising to promote mushroom
sales.166
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court declared the
mandatory assessments on mushroom producers unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began by emphasizing that
the law forced the challengers to express "[t]he message . . . that
mushrooms are worth consuming whether or not they are branded"
instead of its preferred message that its brand was superior to the
others. 167 Justice Kennedy said: "First Amendment values are at seri-
ous risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a dis-
crete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side
it favors," and therefore, "the compelled funding for the advertising
must pass First Amendment scrutiny."1 68
The Court then proceeded to distinguish Glickman. For example,
Justice Kennedy said that "in Glickman, the mandated assessments for
speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting
marketing autonomy," whereas " [h]ere. . . the advertising itself. .. is
the principal object of the marketing scheme." 69 justice Kennedy
also said that in Glickman, California tree fruit producers were con-
strained in other aspects of their marketing, but no similar restrictions
applied to mushroom producers who were not bound by the statute to
"associate as a group which makes cooperative decisions."170 Justice
Kennedy said that it did not matter that the "party who protests the
assessment here is required simply to support speech by others, not to
utter the speech itself."'I7 The Court expressly cited to Abood and
Keller to support its conclusion that "the mandated support is contrary
to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expres-
sion by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but
who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or
necessity.172
It is hard to see a meaningful distinction between Glickman and
United Foods other than that one involved mushrooms and the other
tree fruit. Although the majority in United Foods insisted there was a
persuasive distinction based on the presence of other regulations of
tree fruit producers in Glickman, as Justice Breyer explained, it is hard
to see why the existence of other regulations should matter in assess-
ing the permissibility of mandatory assessments.' 73 If compulsory pay-
166 Id.
167 Id. at 411.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 411-12.
170 Id. at 412-13.
171 Id. at 413.
172 Id
173 Id. at 420-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ment to subsidize advertising is compelled speech, it matters not
whether the compelled speech is part of a complex regulatory regime
or a simple one.
4. So When Does Compelled Speech Violate the First Amendment?
This review of the compelled speech cases shows that contrary to
the assumption of the Knox majority, there is no coherent principle as
to what is compelled speech or when it violates the First Amendment.
In fact, the Court is markedly inconsistent on at least four distinct
questions:
When does the ability of a speaker to express separate views prevent com-
pelled funding from being regarded as compelled speech? In FAIR, the Court
expressly found that there was not compelled speech because law
schools still could say what they wanted.174 In PruneYard, the Court
noted that shopping centers could still express their own views.1 75 But
in Knox, it did not matter that nonunion members retained their abil-
ity to say whatever they want,176 and the Court in Street ignored Justice
Frankfurter's dissent asserting that payment of union dues does not
compel speech because the individuals retain the right to express
their own views.177
When are forced monetary contributions a violation of the First Amend-
ment? In some financial support as compelled speech cases, the Court
has upheld compulsory payments by pointing out that a person giving
financial support to an entity that will spend it on speech with which
the person disagrees is a less substantial intrusion on First Amend-
ment rights than when the government itself forces or prohibits an
individual to state a message. Thus, in upholding compulsory pay-
ment of student activity fees in Southworth, the Court emphasized that
student fees would ultimately support a wide array of views, only some
of which some students might find objectionable.1 78 "It is not for the
Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an
institution of higher learning."1 79 Similarly, the Court has noted that
requiring a financial contribution does not force the dissenter to state
a position; it simply enables the third party to state a position. As the
Court remarked in Abood,
174 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006).
175 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
176 See 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295-96 (2012).
177 See 367 U.S. 740, 806 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
178 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000). Of course, the special assessment in Knox supported a
wide array of views, not all of which were political. 132 S. Ct. at 2285. And the Court has
never required union dissenters to prove that they actually disagree with all of the political
views expressed by the union.
179 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232.
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[a] public employee who believes that a union representing him is
urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not
barred from expressing his viewpoint. Besides voting in accordance
with his convictions, every public employee is largely free to express
his views, in public or private, orally or in writing.1s0
By sharp contrast, the Court found in Knox that requiring individ-
uals to pay a special assessment violated the First Amendment.'8 1
When does allowing opt out satisfy the First Amendment? If associa-
tional speech constitutes compelled speech of dissenters, the question
then becomes whether allowing opt out cures the problem. In cases
such as Wooley, Abood, and Keller, the ability to opt out-by putting
masking tape over the words on a license plate or declining to pay a
portion of dues-is sufficient to meet the First Amendment. 182
In the labor context, under cases like Abood, opt out has likewise
long been deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of the First
Amendment. In Knox, by contrast, opt out was expressly held to be
insufficient to satisfy the First Amendment. Why is opt out necessary
at all? Why, if it is necessary, is it sufficient? Why is opt out insuffi-
cient in other cases?
When is there a sufficiently compelling interest to justify compelled speech
with no opt out? In Southworth, the Court found that the interest in
having compulsory student activity fees meant there was no First
Amendment violation, but in Knox the Court found that even an opt-
out approach was not enough to satisfy the First Amendment.
B. The Rights of Associations
There is another interrelated strand of First Amendment law that
underlies the Court's decision in Knox. the rights of the association as
opposed to those of its dissenting members. In Knox, the Court gave
no weight whatsoever to the First Amendment rights of the entity, the
union, or the union's majority who wanted to express a political mes-
sage. Rather, the focus was entirely on protecting dissenting members
who did not want to support the union's opposition to ballot initia-
tives which would have been quite harmful to unionized government
employees.' 83
Yet, in other contexts, the Court has made exactly the opposite
choice, favoring the free speech of the entity and its majority over that
of any dissenters. The most obvious example of this was the Court's
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which held that
180 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 230 (1977).
181 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
182 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36; Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1977).
183 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289.
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restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations violated the
First Amendment.18 4 In a five-to-four decision, with Justice Kennedy
writing for the majority, the Court held that corporations have free
speech rights and that the limits on independent expenditures are
unconstitutional restrictions of core political speech. The Court de-
clared: " [T] he Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-
profit corporations."185
Indeed, the Court was emphatic on the importance of protecting
the speech rights of the corporate entity. It declared:
The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Gov-
ernment has muffled the voices that best represent the most signifi-
cant segments of the economy. And the electorate has been
deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its func-
tion. By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-
profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and
viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which
persons or entities are hostile to their interests.' 86
The Court was untroubled by the fact that spending from general
corporate revenues meant that the corporation was spending the
shareholders' money on political activities without their consent and
even against their political views. Prior Supreme Court decisions that
had justified restrictions on corporate political expenditures were in
part based on the need to keep shareholders' money from being
spent on political matters in a manner they might oppose.' 87 Prior to
Citizens United, corporations could spend money on political cam-
paigns by creating political action committees that raised funds for
those activities. 88 In this way, all of the corporate funds spent on
campaigns were raised from those who wanted to support the corpora-
tion's political activities. But Citizens United held that this is not
enough to satisfy the free speech rights of corporations; the First
184 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
185 Id. at 913.
186 Id. at 907 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658, 666 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (justifying the restriction on corporate spending
in elections); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003), overruled by Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. 876 (explaining that having corporations engage in political expenditures
through political action committees "allows corporate political participation without the
temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the
sentiments of some shareholders or members" (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
163 (2003)).
188 See McConnel 540 U.S. at 203 ("The ability to form and administer separate segre-
gated funds .. . has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient
opportunity to engage in express advocacy.").
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Amendment gives to them the right to spend unlimited amounts of
money from corporate treasuries to elect or defeat candidates. 89
In Citizens United, the Court rejected the notion that restrictions
on how an organization spends general treasury money are justified by
the need to protect dissenting shareholders' rights. The Court of-
fered three reasons for rejecting the compelled speech argument.
First, protecting dissenters within the entity does not justify restricting
the First Amendment rights of the entity to spend money because it
gives the government power to restrict the speech activities of the en-
tity.190 Second, dissenters can protect their interests "through the
procedures of corporate democracy."191 Third, a restriction on the
entity's political expenditures is both overinclusive and underinclusive
as a method of protecting the First Amendment rights of dissenters. It
was overinclusive because some dissenters might support the expendi-
tures and underinclusive because it did not ban all speech that dis-
senters might oppose, just some political expenditures.19 2 In a prior
corporate campaign finance case, the Court rejected the purported
state interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from subsidizing
corporate political speech by pointing out that the restriction on cor-
porate speech did not cover "business trusts, real estate investment
trusts, [and] labor unions."193
All of the same objections could be made regarding restrictions
on union speech, and the same arguments could be made for al-
lowing the union to speak over the objections of nonmembers.194
First, preventing unions from spending some of their general treasury
on political messages restricts the entity's speech in the name of pro-
tecting the dissenters.
Second, in unions far more than in corporations, employees have
an array of legal protections to enable them to challenge the leader-
ship. Members have rights under statute or under most unions' con-
stitutions and bylaws to vote on the assessment of dues, on ratification
of a collective bargaining agreement, and on the leadership of the
189 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 ("No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits
on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.").
190 Id. at 911.
191 Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
192 Id.; see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793 (holding the statute in question was underinclu-
sive because "[clorporate expenditures with respect to a referendum are prohibited, while
corporate activity with respect to the passage or defeat of legislation is permitted").
193 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793.
194 In Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 39-46 (2011), Professor Charlotte Garden pointed out the inconsistencies
between Citizens United and the dues objector cases. She suggested Citizens United might be
the basis for asserting a challenge to the labor cases to expand not just "what unions are
permitted to say but also with what money they can say it." Id. at 46. Our argument is
consistent with hers, although we take a somewhat different approach.
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union.195 Shareholders have far fewer rights to protect their interests
through the procedures of corporate democracy.1 9 6
Third, the Court never even mentioned overinclusiveness and un-
derinclusiveness in addressing the constitutionality of the rules pro-
tecting dissenters in Knox. If a restriction on corporate political
speech is constitutionally infirm because it is underinclusive in not
protecting other organizational dissenters, it is difficult to see why a
law that targets only labor unions is not similarly underinclusive and
therefore constitutionally infirm. A ban on all union political expend-
itures is overinclusive in disregarding whether the dissenting em-
ployee opposes all or only some of the union's political messages, just
as a ban on all corporate independent political expenditures is overin-
clusive. For example, some California public sector employees might
have opposed Proposition 76 (which would have given the governor
the unilateral power to cut appropriations for public employee com-
pensation) even if they supported Proposition 75 (which would have
required employees to opt in to union political expenditures). There
is no reason why the overbreadth and the underbreadth problems are
any different in Citizens United as opposed to Knox. And it is intellectu-
ally indefensible for the Court to use overbreadth or underbreadth as
bases for rejecting limits on corporate political speech while never
even mentioning those problems in upholding limits on union politi-
cal speech.
The real reason why the Court thinks corporate political spend-
ing is not compelled speech and union political spending is was the
one stated in an earlier campaign finance case, First National Bank of
195 See infra Part IV.B.1 (noting that unions must allow members to vote on dues in-
creases, vote on union contract ratification, speak at union meetings, and run for office).
There are, however, some limits on employees' rights. Employees who refuse to become
union members and who pay only agency fees cannot vote on union leadership. SeeJen-
nifer Friesen, The Costs of "Free Speech "-Restrictions on the Use of Union Dues to Fund New
Organizing, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 638 n.117 (1988). Employees do not have statu-
tory rights to vote on ratification of collective bargaining agreements, although most union
constitutions and bylaws provide for employee votes on ratification. See, e.g., Arnold v. U.S.
Indus., Inc.,Jane Colby Div., 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2714, 2718 (W.D. Va. 1981) ("No vote of
the membership is needed to validate [a modification to a collective bargaining agree-
ment] in the absence of an express requirement in the agreement, or in the constitution
or bylaws of the union."). And unions that do not represent private sector workers are not
covered by the federal statute providing rights to vote on union leadership; whether state
laws provide such rights to employees represented by public sector unions (such as the
Fraternal Order of Police) varies from state to state.
196 Corporate law scholars have refuted the notion that shareholders can control cor-
porate political speech through the channels of corporate democracy for decades, cer-
tainly since Victor Brudney's classic 1981 article, Business Corporations and Stockholders'Rights
Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARv. L. REv. 83, 84 (2010) (ac-
knowledging that corporate speech is not dependent on shareholder input and recom-
mending lawmakers adopt rules requiring shareholder input).
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Boston v. Bellotti: workers are compelled to fund union political speech
but shareholders are not because the latter can simply sell their shares
in the corporation but the former would have to quit theirjob. 197 As
Professor Sachs has explained, the notion that quitting ajob to avoid
an objectionable contract term is coercion but selling shares in a cor-
poration is not does not withstand careful scrutiny, particularly (but
not exclusively) in those instances in which people cannot sell their
shares because they are participants in a pension fund.198
The amount of compulsion inflicted by organizational speech
may vary slightly among types of speech and organization, but the dif-
ferences are slight. Investors can theoretically choose to buy shares
only in companies whose political spending and advertising does not
offend their views, although it may be difficult to find such a company
among the Fortune 500. Pension plan participants, however, typically
cannot choose the stocks held by their plans and thus cannot avoid
whatever compulsion of speech is associated with owning stock. Simi-
larly, those who buy life insurance may find it impossible to avoid their
premium contributions being directed to entities whose political
spending or advertising they find offensive. A secretary who wishes to
avoid associating with a union can find a job with a nonunion com-
pany. A police officer may find it impossible to get an equivalent job
without union representation other than by moving to a state that
does not allow public sector employees to unionize. Students could
choose to attend a university that does not collect student fees to sup-
port views they oppose, but that might involve foregoing the chance to
attend the University of Wisconsin and choosing to attend a private,
religiously affiliated university instead. A boy who wishes to go camp-
ing and hiking with his friends from school has no alternative to the
Boy Scouts. Finally, to take the recently salient example of corpora-
tions or religiously affiliated entities being forced to offer health insur-
ance plans that cover contraception or the full range of reproductive
health services, there is no more coercion in the corporation having
to offer the benefits package than there is in an employee having to
contribute premiums to an insurer whose political spending, advertis-
ing, or benefits packages offend her views.
There is thus a sharp and deeply disturbing contrast between Citi-
zens United and Knox. In Citizens United, the Court protected the free
speech rights of the entity and was unconcerned about the free
speech rights of the shareholders who disagreed with its political ex-
penditures. In Knox, the Court paid no attention to the free speech
197 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (1978).
198 Sachs, supra note 4, at 808-09, 833-44 (concluding that both avoiding investments
in the stock market and working in unionizedjobs in order to avoid subsidizing objectional
political speech involve coercion and impose unacceptable costs).
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rights of the the union and was entirely focused on protecting the free
speech rights of the nonmembers who disagreed with its political
expenditures.199
Other cases, too, have protected the free speech rights of the as-
sociation with little concern about the rights of dissenting members.
Consider, for example, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale2 oo: in Dale, the
Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that freedom of association pro-
tects the right of the Boy Scouts to exclude gays in violation of a state's
antidiscrimination statute.201 James Dale was a lifelong scout who had
reached the rank of Eagle Scout and had become an assistant scout-
master.202 While in college, he became involved in gay rights activities
and was quoted in a newspaper article on the psychological needs of
gay and lesbian teenagers and was identified in the article as the co-
president of the Gay/Lesbian Alliance at Rutgers University.203 A
scout official saw this article and sent Dale a letter excluding him from
further participation in the Scouts. 2 0 4
Dale sued under the New Jersey antidiscrimination law. 2 05 The
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts were not ex-
empt from the law as a private club and rejected the Boy Scouts' claim
that freedom of association protected their right to discriminate based
on sexual orientation. 206
In the Supreme Court, the Boy Scouts claimed that they had an
expressive message that was antigay and that forcing them to include
homosexuals undermined this communicative goal. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion acknowledged that "[o]bviously, the
Scout Oath and Law do not expressly mention sexuality or sexual ori-
entation."207 But Chief Justice Rehnquist was willing to find such a
goal based on the Boy Scouts' interpretation of its own words, such as
its command that scouts be "morally straight," and from the position
it had taken during litigation.208
In other words, the Court in Dale essentially held that during liti-
gation, a group can define its own expressive message. Chief Justice
199 One possible distinction between these cases is based on state action: in Knox, the
law determines what nonmembers must contribute to the union, whereas in Citizens United,
no law required individuals to contribute to the corporation. For a detailed discussion of
this distinction, see infra Part IV.B.2.
200 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
201 Id. at 643-44.
202 Id. at 644-45.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 645.
206 Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1213, 1230 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530
U.S. 640 (2000).
207 Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
208 Id. at 650-55.
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Rehnquist said that its failure to clearly state such a communicative
goal in advance is not determinative: "The fact that the organization
does not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dis-
sent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First
Amendment protection."209
The Court in Dale focused entirely on the First Amendment rights
of the association. The Court gave no weight to the rights of dissent-
ing members, such as James Dale. In fact, the Court's holding was
that state law could not protect these individuals, even when the
state's objective was to prevent discrimination.2 10 A local Boy Scout
troop that disagreed with the national policy was powerless to allow
gays to serve. Those who disagreed with the Boy Scouts could resign
from the Scouts or refrain from joining, but the law could do nothing
else to stop the Boy Scouts from discriminating against homosexuals.
In sharp contrast, the Court in Knox paid no attention to the First
Amendment rights of the union as an entity or its majority. The
Court held that even allowing nonmembers to opt out of the political
expenditures was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the First
Amendment.211
The Court's only effort to reconcile the compelled speech cases
of union dues and the organizational free speech rights of Dale and
Rumsfeld v. FAIR was in Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n, which
upheld a state law requiring that nonmembers opt into supporting
union political activities.212 Justice Scalia explained that Dale and
FAIR are irrelevant because the Washington prohibition on union po-
litical speech "does not compel respondent's acceptance of unwanted
members or otherwise make union membership less attractive."213 If,
however, there is a First Amendment right of an organization to ex-
press itself over the objection of dissenters, there is no reason why that
right should apply only to expelling members and firing employees,
and not to how the organization spends money. If the Boy Scouts'
First Amendment right to express a homophobic message trumps
Dale's statutory right to be free from discrimination, there is no rea-
son why a teachers' union's right to oppose charter schools and
vouchers should not trump its members' rights to espouse them. Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion does not even try to explain why the factual dif-
ference (spending money versus discriminating in hiring and
membership) generates a constitutionally significant legal difference
in the balance between the rights of the leadership and the rights of
209 Id. at 656.
210 Id. at 656-61.
211 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291 (2012).
212 551 U.S. 177, 191-92 (2007).
213 Id. at 187 n.2.
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the dissenters. Indeed, one would think that the harm to dissenting
Scouts-being ejected from an organization to which some boys
devote much of their childhood and adolescence-is far greater than
the harm to employees who are compelled to pay an extra fifty or one
hundred dollars to a union.214
The contrast between Dale and Knox also illustrates the difficulty
with the notion that anti-union employees are coerced by union politi-
cal speech but gay or gay-sympathetic scouts are not coerced by the
Scouts. As Professor Sachs has shown, a worker who wishes to avoid a
unionized workplace has many options in a private sector job market
with only seven percent union density. 2 15 A boy who spent his child-
hood as a scout has no comparable alternative to the Scouts when he
comes out as gay in his teens. Even if we focus on the initial decision
to join rather than the more painful decision to quit, the coercion is
not comparable. Just ask any parent who has tried to explain to a six-
year-old son why he could not join the local Boy Scout troop that
many of his school friends are joining.
C. Speech Rights of Government Employees
There is a third important strand of free speech law that under-
lies Knox: the First Amendment rights of government employees. The
holding of Knox is that government employees have a First Amend-
ment right not to be charged for a special assessment that the union
will use in part for political activities unless they opt into paying for
this charge.216 Oddly, Knox even appeared to say that employees must
be allowed to opt into a special assessment that will be used entirely
for activities that would be chargeable to objectors if they were funded
by annual dues rather than by special assessment. It is a decision en-
tirely about protecting the speech rights of government employees.
Yet this robust protection of the speech rights of government employ-
ees simply cannot be reconciled with the Court's other decisions
which give little or no protection for the speech rights of government
employees.
Most recently and most dramatically, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the
Court held that there is no First Amendment protection against ad-
214 The Court in FAIR similarly distinguished Dale on the ground that forcing the Boy
Scouts to accept gays made it harder for them to express their message than forcing law
schools to subject their students to discriminatory employers made it for the schools to
express a message of equality. 547 U.S. 47, 69-70 (2006). Yet the Court did not explain
how requiring the law school to subject its students to discrimination made it easier to
convey a message of equality than prohibiting the Boy Scouts from discriminating made it
for them to condemn homosexuality. In both cases, the organizations remained free to say
anything they wanted.
215 See Sachs, supra note 4, at 834-35.
216 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295-96.
1064 [Vol. 98:1023
2013] POLITICAL SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
verse employment action for the speech of government employees
made on the job and is within the scope of their duties.217 Ironically,
Garcetti was a five-to-four decision with the majority rejecting free
speech rights of government employees being exactly the same as the
majority that had protected the speech rights of government employ-
ees in Knox. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.218
Garcetti involved Richard Ceballos, a supervising district attorney
in Los Angeles County who concluded that a witness in one of his
cases, a deputy sheriff, was not telling the truth.219 He wrote a memo
to this effect and felt that the Constitution required him to inform the
defense of the witness' false statement.220 As a result of this speech,
Ceballos alleged that his employers retaliated against him by transfer-
ring him to a less desirable position and denying him a promotion.22'
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Ceballos'
speech was protected by the First Amendment. Although the Su-
preme Court had long held that there was some constitutional protec-
tion for the speech of government employees,222 it ruled against
Ceballos and nearly eliminated the First Amendment speech rights of
government employees. The Court drew a distinction between speech
"as a citizen" as opposed to "as a public employee"; only the former is
protected by the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy stated: " [W] hen
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment pur-
poses, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline."2 2 3 The Court expressed concern about
the disruptive effects of allowing employees to bring First Amendment
claims based on their on-the-job speech. Justice Kennedy wrote that
allowing such claims "would commit state and federal courts to a new,
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of com-
munications between and among government employees and their
superiors in the course of official business. This displacement of man-
agerial discretion by judicial supervision finds no support in our
precedents."224
There is an obvious tension between Garcetti's rejection of any
speech protection for government employees and Knox's emphatic
217 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
218 See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2284; Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 412.
219 547 U.S. at 414.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 415.
222 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that government
employee's speech is protected by the First Amendment if it involves a matter of public
concern and does not unduly interfere with the functioning of the workplace).
223 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
224 Id. at 423.
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protection of speech rights of government employees.225 The distinc-
tion between speech as an employee and speech as a citizen is highly
questionable; after all, government employees do not give up their
citizenship when they enter their workplace. But if there is such a
distinction, the government employees in Knox were being asked to
pay the assessment precisely because they were government employees
and were speaking in this capacity through their union. The Court in
Garcetti was concerned about judicial involvement in the workplace,
but in Knox it had no concerns about judicial involvement in the work-
place and in deciding what unions can and cannot charge employees
for.
Nor has the Court been protective of the speech rights of govern-
ment employees when they are off the job. In a series of cases, begin-
ning with Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court has held that the
speech of government employees, when off the job, is protected only
if it involves a matter of public concern and only if, on balance, the
employee's speech rights outweigh the employer's interests in the effi-
cient functioning of the office.226 Phrased another way, the employee
can prevail only if he or she convinces the court that speech was the
basis for the adverse employment action; if the court concludes that
the speech is related to matters of public concern; and if the court
decides that, on balance, the speech interests outweigh the govern-
ment's interests in regulating the expression for the sake of the effi-
ciency of the office. Not surprisingly, government employees do not
usually succeed under this test.227
Thus, the Court provides no protection for the speech of govern-
ment employees on the job and relatively little for it off the job. But
when it comes to the right to resist contributions to the union, the
same five Justices who were in the majority in Garcetti granted govern-
225 We are not the first to observe this. See Malin, supra note 34, at 298-99. A similar
point was made about decisions prior to Knox. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Em-
ployee Speech: Governments Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DuKE
L.J. 1, 3-4 (2009) (noting doctrinal shift in courts' treatment of public employees' First
Amendment claims and proposing new constitutional frameworks with less deferential ap-
proach to assessing government's expressive claims).
226 391 U.S. at 571-73 (holding that a public school teacher's letter to a newspaper
criticizing the board's allocation of funds is protected since the subject was a matter of
public attention and the letter did not impede employee's daily duties or interfere with
regular school operations); see United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454,
465-66 (1995) (holding that government employees' expressive activities addressed to
public audience outside the workplace and unrelated to government employment was pro-
tected); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that a public employee's
questionnaire distributed among staff members is not protected because it concerned in-
ternal office policy and was not a matter of public concern).
227 See Richard Michael Fischl, Commentary, Labor, Management, and the First Amend-
ment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 729, 732-36 (1989) (noting the
breadth of employers' First Amendment rights and the narrowness of employees' First
Amendment rights).
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ment employees broad First Amendment rights to refuse to partici-
pate in funding an organization's speech with which they disagree. It
appears that the only robust free speech rights government employees
have is the right to refuse to support unions.
III
THE IMPLICATIONS OF KNox
Having examined the holding and the constitutional underpin-
nings of Knox, we now describe two principal implications of Knox.
First, it likely will significantly decrease the speech and political activi-
ties of unions. Second, the Court's language and reasoning calls into
question the very existence of collective bargaining based on princi-
ples of exclusivity and majority rule. We argue that both of these im-
plications are very undesirable for society and for constitutional law.
Neither, of course, is preordained, and we urge the Court to reject
both.
A. Implications of Knox for the Future of Union Political
Activities
As both the concurring and dissenting opinions point out, the
majority's opinion in Knox raises doubts about the constitutional valid-
ity of the opt out regime that has been a settled feature of the law of
union dues under the RLA and public sector statutes since the 1960s
and '70s and under the NLRA since the Court's holding in Communi-
cations Workers v. Beck in 1988.228 Although the holding of Knox is lim-
ited to requiring opt in for special assessments, there is nothing in the
majority's reasoning that is limited to this.
In supposing that most nonmembers prefer not to pay full dues,
that the default rule "should comport with the probable preferences
of most nonmembers," and that an opt-out rule "creates a risk that the
fees paid by nonmembers will be used to further political and ideolog-
ical ends with which they do not agree," the Court clearly suggested
that opt in is constitutionally required.229 Moreover, in characterizing
the opt-out rule as "a historical accident,"230 "dicta,"231 and an "off-
hand remark,"232 justice Alito sought to undermine the integrity of
the opt-out rule. Finally, in suggesting that the prior decisions al-
lowing opt out "approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the
228 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'1 Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2297-99 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2306-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting).






First Amendment can tolerate,"2 3 3 the majority invited a next case in
which the Court can cite to this decision as precedent acknowledging
the impropriety of an opt-out rule in all circumstances, not just for
special assessments.
Requiring employees to opt into union political spending will re-
duce the number of employees who contribute and the total amount
that employees will contribute to political expenditures as compared
to an opt-out rule. It will not necessarily do so because of employees'
preferences about union political activity but rather because of some
mix of a collective action problem and inertia. First, the collective
action problem facing employees who wish to advocate for improved
working conditions through political activity is the same as the collec-
tive action problem thatjustifies majority unionism in contract negoti-
ation. An opt-in rule simply makes it harder to overcome the
collective action problem. As Mancur Olson pointed out a half cen-
tury ago, without a union security agreement, many employees will
make the individually rational decision to refrain from paying union
dues because improved wages and working conditions are collective
goods that cannot be extended to some in a unionized workplace
without extending them to all.2 3 4 So long as other employees fund
the union, the free-riding employees will get the benefit of collective
bargaining without paying the costs. The problem is that all of the
individually rational decisions will add up to a collectively irrational
decision. 2 3 5 The same is true, of course, when a union uses a political
strategy to improve working conditions. All teachers (and students)
benefit from smaller classes, but the individually rational teacher
would prefer that others fund the political efforts to achieve it. How-
ever, the Court has never explained why the collective action problem
that justifies employees agreeing to compel everyone who benefits
from collective bargaining to share the costs should not also justify
employees agreeing to compel everyone who benefits from legislation
to share the costs.
The second reason why an opt-in rule will reduce union political
activity is inertia. Behavioral economic studies show that setting the
default in an optional savings plan, for example, dramatically affects
whether people will participate.23 6 If the default is that employees
233 Id. at 2291.
234 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE Locic OF COLLECTIVE AcTION 76-91 (1965).
235 See id. at 88 (noting that the "profit motive" of rational workers would lead to the
death of unions because "[a] rational worker will not voluntarily contribute to a (large)
union providing a collective benefit since he alone would not perceptibly strengthen the
union, and since he would get the benefits of any union achievements whether or not he
supported the union").
236 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More TomorrowM: Using Behav-
ioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112J. POL. EcON. S164, S169 (2004) (noting that
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contribute to a retirement savings plan, most employees will not elect
to change the default. If the default is that employees do not contrib-
ute, more employees will not, even when contributing is beneficial to
the employee (as where the employer will match the employee
contribution).
Inertia, however, is not the same as lack of support for a union's
political activity. Under an opt-out regime, no employee is ever com-
pelled to finance union political spending. If there were a solid em-
pirical basis for believing that nonmembers know what the union's
political positions are and disagree with a majority of them, setting the
default as opt in might make sense. But there is no such basis. In a
unionized workplace, a majority can choose union representation and
a majority can rid themselves of a union. One might reasonably infer
that the likely preference of the majority is to support at least some
political activities that the union, through its duly elected leadership,
deems to be in the best interest of the membership. Even considering
only those employees who choose not to become union members, we
still know little about which of the union's political expenditures they
oppose. A teacher might refuse to join a union because he objects to
the union's handling of allegations of teacher misconduct but might
support the union's political efforts to reduce class sizes or resist cuts
to arts education. That is the reason why the Supreme Court had,
until Knox, consistently held that dissent from the union's political
activities is not to be presumed but must be established by the em-
ployee. That some employees chose to reduce their union contribu-
tions by becoming fee payers does not indicate which of the union's
political activities they oppose.
Not only is there no empirical or theoretical basis for the Knox
majority's policy preference for opt-in rules, there is no constitutional
basis for it either. As the Court insisted in Citizens United,237 South-
worth,23 8 Dale,239 and in a number of other cases going back to its civil
rights era decisions about the free speech rights of associations, 240 or-
ganizations have First Amendment rights both because of the benefit
to members of the association and because of the benefit to the public
automatic enrollment significantly increases participation in savings plans due to inertia
against changing default); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retire-
ment Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 12009, 2006), available at www.nber.com/papers/wl2009 (presenting
empirical evidence on how default selections impact retirement savings outcomes).
237 130 S. Ct. 876, 898-99, 904-08 (2010).
238 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000).
239 530 U.S. 640, 647-48, 660 (2000).
240 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963) ("[T]he litigation [the
NAACP] assists, while serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the American
Negro community, at the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the
distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.").
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of having more voices heard. By imposing an opt-in rule on one cate-
gory of association (labor organizations) and for one category of
speech (political expenditures), the majority in Knox created a legal
rule that discriminates both against certain speakers (unions) and on
the basis of certain types of speech (political expenditures). Reducing
the ability of a union to make political expenditures sacrifices the First
Amendment rights of the association and its members to the rights of
nonmembers.
Another troublesome implication of the Knox opinion is that
some of its stray language casts doubt on the location of the line be-
tween chargeable germane expenses and nonchargeable political ex-
penses. The majority noted that a public sector union "takes many
positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political and
civic consequences" and therefore that agency fees "constitute a form
of compelled speech and association that imposes a significant im-
pingement on First Amendment rights."241 Moreover, the majority
derided the notion that political activities, even in support of the
union's contract negotiation goals, could be chargeable. 242 Prior de-
cisions (including ElliS2 4 3 and LehnerP244) had held that some political
activity is chargeable because it is part of the union's effort to secure
its collective bargaining agreement (as, for example, where an execu-
tive or legislative body can reject or modify an agreement negotiated
by a government agency). Yet in Knox, the majority challenged the
independent auditors' determination that fifty-six percent of the prior
year's expenditures were chargeable by rejecting how the SEIU had
characterized the germaneness of some expenses, including lobby-
ing.245 Further, the majority noted:
Public-employee salaries, pensions, and other benefits constitute a
substantial percentage of the budgets of many States and their sub-
divisions. As a result, a broad array of ballot questions and cam-
paigns for public office may be said to have an effect on present and
future contracts between public-sector workers and their
employers. 246
The germaneness line has been the subject of litigation and con-
flicting results in the lower courts.24 7 Some courts have held that the
241 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'I Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012) (empha-
sis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242 Id. at 2294.
243 Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1984).
244 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 522-24 (1991).
245 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2294.
246 Id. at 2295.
247 Indeed, the entire notion that a union's activities can and should be divided into
those that are "economic" as opposed to those that are "political" is problematic, as Justice
Frankfurter noted when the Court first invented the dissenters' opt-out right in Street. See
supra text accompanying notes 52-55. Unions have always pursued improvements in the
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cost of organizing new workers is chargeable if the union can show
that there is a correlation between the wages and union density in the
relevant labor market.2 4 8 Others have held that the cost of organizing
is chargeable only when it is directed at eliminating wage competition
affecting the objector's bargaining unit.2 4 9 Political expenses may be
chargeable by public sector unions if they are aimed at securing a new
collective bargaining agreement. 250 In addition, courts have treated
chargeability for union expenses and chargeability of expenses of
state bar associations quite differently: two circuits held that a state
bar's public relations campaign was chargeable even though a plural-
ity in Lehnert v. Fenis Faculty Ass'n said that a union's public relations
campaign was not chargeable without explaining why building public
confidence in the organized bar is different from building employee
confidence in a union or its employees.251
Having thus insisted that even ordinary public sector collective
bargaining is "a form of compelled speech and association that im-
poses a 'significant impingement on First Amendment rights"' and
lives of workers through legislative activism for minimum wage laws, maximum hours laws,
prohibitions on child labor, workplace safety and health measures, and the like. Moreover,
the entire notion that the "political" and the "economic" are separable in labor law or
anywhere else has been debunked by legal scholars and labor leaders for decades. See, e.g.,
Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60
TEX. L. REv. 1, 14-17 (1981) ("Where effective representation requires expenditures in
order to set up a coalition of recipients of social services to press for higher appropriations,
launch a nationwide campaign against a wage control program that threatens bargain-
ing ... I see no reason why employees who derive the benefits from these political efforts
should not be required to render them support."); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to
Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 43 (1999) ("[U]nion political activity is wholly germane to a
union's work in the realm of collective bargaining, and thus a reasonable means to attain-
ing the union's proper object of advancing the economic interest of the worker.") (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); J. Albert Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law and the
Workers' Needs, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 130, 144 (1961) (noting that union political action "is a
legitimate if not indispensable means of advancing the cause of organized labor" and is
germane to economic interests because it can result in the "defeat of unfavorable legisla-
tion," or "strengthen the union's bargaining position") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
248 Pirlott v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 423, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 284 F.3d 1099, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (holding that a union may charge nonmembers costs of organizing employers within
the same competitive market).
249 Scheffer v. Civil Ser. Emps. Ass'n, Local 828, 610 F.3d 782, 789-91 (2d Cir. 2010).
250 Seidemann v. Bowen, 584 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2009).
251 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528-29 (1991) (plurality opinion);
Kingstad v. State Bar of Wis., 622 F.3d 708, 719 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting challenge against
use of bar dues to fund television advertising showing lawyers engaged in community ser-
vice and finding that such ads might improve public perception of lawyers); Gardner v.
State Bar of Nev., 284 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating without explanation that a
PR campaign to improve the public perception of lawyers is germane to the purpose of
state bar even though a similar campaign by a union to improve the public perception of
teachers is not germane to the purpose of a union).
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questioned whether "the Court's former cases have given adequate
recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake,"25 2 the
Knox majority disparaged the justification for unions charging non-
members even for germane services. The majority said that "free-rider
arguments, however, are generally insufficient to overcome First
Amendment objections" and that recognizing the free-rider justifica-
tion in the past was "an anomaly ... we have found to be justified by
the interest in furthering 'labor peace.'"258
The result again is that the political speech and political activities
of unions will be significantly reduced in the future. The tension
within the Court's decision in Citizens United is manifest: within two
years, the Court has greatly strengthened the speech rights of corpora-
tions and greatly weakened the speech rights of unions.
B. Implications of Knox for the Future of Public Sector
Collective Bargaining
Justice Alito's majority opinion does more than just threaten the
political influence of unions. It contains language that, if miscon-
strued, could be used to attack the entire architecture of public sector
collective bargaining on the basis of exclusivity and majority rule.
This implication is not noted by any of the opinions in Knox. We em-
phasize that nothing in Knox holds that majority rule unionism is un-
constitutional. We explore this aspect of Knox for the light it sheds on
the majority's implicit policy judgments about the First Amendment
rights of unions as compared to other associations and individuals.
The language in Knox suggests that requiring nonmembers to pay
any money to a union is unconstitutional. Justice Alito said, "by al-
lowing unions to collect any fees from nonmembers and by permitting
unions to use opt-out rather than opt-in schemes when annual dues
are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First
Amendment rights of nonmembers."2 5 4 Moreover, in a footnote, Jus-
tice Alito suggested that because "a union's money is fungible," a
union's expenditure of objectors' fees "entirely for nonpolitical activi-
ties" might be problematic because "it would free up other funds to be
spent for political purposes."255
On that analysis, requiring dissenters to pay any money to the
union may result in the union using the dissenters' money to fund
political activities. If the Court were to follow that path, the entire
252 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012) (quoting
Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)).
253 Id. at 2289-90 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
303 (1986)).
254 Id. at 2295.
255 Id. at 2293 n.6.
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system of distinguishing chargeable and nonchargeable expenses is
insufficient to protect objectors because the same dollar that a non-
member pays the union for contract administration might find its way
into a political account, even if a different dollar is placed in the
chargeable category. This would mean that Abood is no longer
enough to protect the rights of employee-objectors. 256
However, the notion that an organization's money is fungible
cuts two ways. In Davenport, the union argued that the restriction on
union expenditures of money on politics infringed the union's First
Amendment rights under Bellotti and Austin.25 7 Justice Scalia dis-
missed the contention: the restriction is not "on how the union can
spend 'its' money." Rather, he said, it was a restriction on how the
union could spend "other people's money."25 8 The opinion insisted that
the only reason the law burdened the union's use of its members'
dues was because the union "chose to commingle those dues with
nonmembers' agency fees." 25 9 Justice Alito's position that any com-
pelled contributions violates dissenters' rights because funds are com-
mingled cannot be reconciled with Justice Scalia's position that
restrictions on unions' expenditures do not violate the union's rights
because the funds are commingled (oddly, Justices Alito and Scalia
joined both opinions). If all money is fungible, then the entire basis
for Abood and Davenport falls apart: none of it is "other people's
money" and all of it is the union's. If unions have the same First
Amendment rights as corporations to spend on politics, then it vio-
lates the union's rights for the government to restrict unions' political
speech, just as it violates corporations' rights.
256 This part of the Knox opinion sits uneasily against the Court's earlier approach to
circumstances when compelled funding of an organization is compelled speech. In Glick-
man, the Court attempted to distinguish its upholding of compelled subsidies for agricul-
tural commodity ads with Abood's prohibition of subsidies for union speech. The Court
said:
Abood, and the cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First Amend-
ment right not to be compelled to provide financial support for any organi-
zation that conducts expressive activities. Rather, Abood merely recognized
a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an
organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's "freedom of be-
lief."
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997) (quoting Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977)). As Robert Post pointed out, it is unclear whether
the issue is compelled speech or compelled association. If the problem is compelled asso-
ciation rather than speech, and payment of agency fees is association, then it is unclear why
distinguishing between germane and nongermane expenditures alleviates the problem of
compelled association, unless one believes that placing dollars in different accounts is a
form of association. Robert Post, Lectures, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Com-
mercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40
VAL. U. L. REv., 555, 571-73 (2006).
257 Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 186 (2007).
258 Id. at 187.
259 Id. at 187 n.2.
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There is another reason to be concerned about the reckless dicta
in Knox. Justice Alito's opinion said that allowing the union to bar-
gain on behalf of nonmembers is compelled speech that is justified by
a governmental interest in "labor peace," a term the opinion put in
quotes as if to belittle it.260 This misrepresents the long line of Su-
preme Court cases stretching back to the 1930s in which the Court
recognized the many governmental interests in protecting the rights
of employees to unionize and bargain collectively on the basis of ex-
clusivity and majority rule. These include the macroeconomic bene-
fits of allowing employees to bargain from a position of collective
strength to improve wages and working conditions; the desirability of
fostering workplace democracy; and the benefits to employees, em-
ployers, and the public of allowing bargaining by one union instead of
many representatives claiming authority as a bargaining agent.2 6' If
the Court determines that labor peace is the only interest justifying
public sector collective bargaining on the basis of exclusivity and ma-
jority rule, it may be poised to find the interest to no longer be com-
pelling. Today, strikes are less likely to happen if there is no union
than if there are multiple unions battling for governmental recogni-
tion, and many public sector employees are prohibited from striking,
so labor peace may not be threatened by eliminating public sector
bargaining. Thus, the Knox dicta on the governmental interests sup-
porting collective bargaining on a majority rule exclusivity basis sug-
gests the majority may be working toward finding it unconstitutional
even if it is done on a free-rider basis.
In identifying these implications, we have assumed, but not justi-
fied, that collective bargaining is desirable and that employees have a
First Amendment right to join unions and, where permitted by stat-
ute, to bargain collectively. This has been the assumption of federal
law, the state law of most states, and of the Supreme Court for de-
cades.26 2 It is grounded in the constitutional right of people to join
260 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
261 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act on the basis of the govern-
ment's interests in promoting economic growth by facilitating equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees). See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMp-
TIONs IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 35-44 (1983) (discussing the purposes of the Wagner Act
with reference to historical materials, including the promotion of economic stability, the
enhancement of equality of bargaining power, and the nurturing of political democracy by
enhancing workplace democracy).
262 See generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBuC WORKERS (2004) (describing the history of
the legal regulation of government employee unionization and collective bargaining); De-
velopments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1611, 1676 (1984) (surveying
statutory, constitutional, and case law on the rights of public employees to unionize and
bargain).
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organizations, including unions.263 Although government employees
have no constitutional right to bargain collectively in the absence of a
statute authorizing it,264 the Supreme Court long ago held that the
government has an important interest in granting employees in both
the private sector and government service the right to bargain collec-
tively on the basis of majority rule and exclusivity. 265
In the wake of the several attacks on public sector collective bar-
gaining, including the Knox dicta suggesting that public sector bar-
gaining is compelled speech, it is important to recall the many reasons
why employees enjoy a constitutional right to join unions and statu-
tory rights to bargain. First, collective bargaining enhances democ-
racy. Employees who can elect representatives to determine the terms
of employment on an equal footing with management learn habits of
self-government and political efficacy.266 Unions historically have
been extraordinarily important political and social associations for
their members. The desire of employees to join together in a com-
mon cause to govern themselves, to learn and teach the value of social
solidarity, to improve their working conditions, and to express their
vision for a better political economy is foundational to the freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment.267 The drive for equal-
ity of bargaining power, self-determination, and fairness is as impor-
tant in the public sector as it is in the private sector, for in neither
context is management by executive fiat consistent with democratic
principles.
Second, public employee unionization and bargaining enhances
the transparency and accountability of government. Unions have
more power than individual employees or citizens to force the govern-
263 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (finding a Texas law restricting union
organization to be a violation of the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly).
264 Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1979).
265 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33-34.
266 See Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Misconception of Right to Work Laws in the United
States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 101, 144 (2005) (surveying literature on connection between unionism and
social capital and asserting that unionism promotes development of social capital); Anne
Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public-Sector Unions, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 301, 308-17
(2011) (surveying political science literature on participatory democracy and the connec-
tion between political democracy and social unit democracy).
267 See James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942-44
(1997) (describing the pervasiveness and significance of unionists' vision of the right to
organize, bargain, and strike as a form of insurgent constitutionalism that placed great
significance on freedom of association). See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Condi-
tions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of
DeBartolo, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 149 (1990) (arguing that the Court's reconciliation of the
First Amendment with the National Labor Relations Act is based on a reductionist view of
unions as limited purpose organizations focused on economic issues and ignores unions'
significant role as associations).
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ment to reveal its budget priorities and to force a debate about such
priorities. 2 6 8 Of course, unions do not always use their collective
power to advocate for government policies that everyone would deem
wise. Left-wing critics of police and prison guards' unions criticize
these unions' support for punitive incarceration policies, just as right-
wing critics of teachers' unions blame them for the failures of the pub-
lic schools. 2 6 9 Leaving aside the obvious fact that the blame for puni-
tive criminal sentencing laws and lousy public schools should be laid
at the door of many people and organizations beyond unionized
guards and teachers, the problem is not the employees through their
union acting as a group; the problem is that people are not always
wise. Eliminating the right of employees to bargain as a group will not
suddenly improve schools or reduce government budget problems.
After all, some states without public sector bargaining rights have
weak public schools and large deficits, and other states with public
sector bargaining rights have strong schools and small deficits. 270
Third, government employee unionization proved necessary for
the same economic reasons that private sector employees joined un-
ions: to ensure decent wages and working conditions. In times of fis-
cal crisis, government employers historically have cut pay dramatically
and unfairly, often paying employees in IOUs. For example, in Chi-
cago during the Great Depression, the Board of Education paid teach-
ers and other school employees in scrip for over a year and then,
when a court invalidated the scrip system, paid them nothing at all for
months on end. 27 1 There is room for policy debate about how much
government employees-teachers, park rangers, bus drivers, police of-
ficers, or DMV clerks-should be paid, what cause should be neces-
sary to terminate their employment, when they should be eligible to
retire, and what kind of retirement and health care benefits they
should receive. But there is no reason to believe that the policy de-
268 Cf Norton, supra note 225, at 30-34 (discussing from the standpoint of govern-
ment transparency the undesirable consequences of cases limiting the free speech rights of
government employees).
269 See, e.g., Mike Dennis, The California Prison Guard's Union: Still Profiting from Incarcera-
tion-Mania, CAL. PROGRESSIVE MESSAGE (March 4, 2011), http://caprogressivemessage.
com/2011/03/04/the-california-prison-guards-union-still-profiting-from-incarceration-
mania/ (criticizing the California Prison Guards Union's support for punitive incarcera-
tion policies); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Bipartisan but Unfounded: The Assault on Teacher's
Unions, Am. EDUCATOR (Am. Federation of Teachers), Winter 2011-2012, at 14, available at
http://www.aft.org/pdfs/americaneducator/winter1l 12/Kahlenberg.pdf.
270 Catherine Fisk & Brian Olney, Labor and the States' Fiscal Problems, in WHEN STATES
Go BROKE 253-55 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr., eds., 2012).
271 SLATER, supra note 262, at 102; see also Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Contracts Clause, 59 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 10-11
(2011) (recounting incidents in various periods of recession in which governments facing
fiscal crises furloughed employees or paid them in IOUs).
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bate about taxes, as opposed to public employee pay, will be better
resolved by unilateral dictate than by bilateral negotiation.
Finally, contrary to the contestable claims of labor critics, public
employee bargaining is not the cause of state and local government
budget deficits. Study after study has shown that, on average, public
sector employees are paid less than comparable private sector employ-
ees.272 While studies have shown that there is a correlation between
public sector bargaining rights and the pay and benefits of govern-
ment employees,273 other studies have shown that there is no correla-
tion between public sector bargaining rights and state budget
deficits.274 Indeed, states with expansive public sector bargaining
rights tend to have smaller budget deficits than do states with no pub-
lic employee bargaining.275 Anecdotal evidence of extraordinarily
high levels of public employee compensation or pension benefits al-
most always concerns management-level public employees-chiefs of
police or fire departments, city managers, and the like-rather than
large numbers of unionized government workers. 276 Indeed, the aver-
age state and local pension benefit is $22,653 per year.2 77
It is important to remember that the most radical implications of
Knox stem from its dicta. But its holding-that unions cannot impose
a special assessment to fund political speech without first getting em-
ployees to opt in-is troubling enough. The Court has never required
corporations and other organizations to play by the same rules it has
imposed on unions. As we and other scholars have pointed out, the
Court's dissimilar treatment of employees and shareholders is difficult
to justify. Its wildly disparate approach to the entire problem of com-
pelled speech, we have shown, ignores the alleged coercion of most
organizational dissenters except anti-union workers. We now consider
what rule should replace the Court's various, different ones in the
area of compelled associational speech.
272 See Fisk & Olney, supra note 270, at 264-70 (surveying literature regarding public
sector employee salaries compared to private sector employee salaries).
273 See, e.g., Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Public Sector Unions and the Costs of Govern-
ment (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=2107862.
274 See Fisk & Olney, supra note 270, at 279-92.
275 Id. (comparing budget deficits to extent of legal rights to bargain in fifty states and
showing no correlation between deficit and bargaining rights).
276 See id.
277 Transparency and Funding of State and Local Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 40 (2011) (statement of Iris J.




RESTORING THE BALANCE AND TREATING ALL
ORGANIZATIONAL DISSENTERs EQUALLY
In this Part, we make three major points. First, in subpart A, we
argue that there is a need for a clearer analytical framework in balanc-
ing the speech rights of entities and those of dissenting individuals.
The Court's approach in Knox and other cases blurs distinct questions.
At the very least, we seek to more clearly identify the issues which
need to be addressed. Second, in subpart B, we argue that under this
analytical framework, unions and corporations should be treated the
same in terms of their speech rights and the speech rights of their
dissenting members and shareholders respectively. We argue here
that there is no basis for the Court's protecting corporation's speech
but giving no protection for dissenting shareholders in Citizens United
while providing no protection for the speech of unions and great pro-
tection for dissenting members in Knox. That, of course, is an argu-
ment to treat corporations and unions the same, but it does not
explain how they should be treated. We address this in subpart C and
argue that allowing a corporation or a union to spend money on polit-
ical activities should not be regarded as compelled speech of its mem-
bers, and even if it is compelled speech, it is justified by sufficient
interests to meet First Amendment scrutiny.
A. An Analytical Framework
Knox and the cases discussed throughout this Article raise three
distinct questions. First, is an entity using an individual's money to
support political activities with which he or she disagrees engaged in
compelled speech within the meaning of the First Amendment? Sec-
ond, if so, is opt out sufficient to meet the requirements of the First
Amendment? Third, if there remains a First Amendment problem of
compelled speech, is there a sufficiently important government justifi-
cation to permit it?
These are distinct questions, and separating them offers greater
clarity than the Court has provided. For example, as to the first ques-
tion, the Court assumed in Knox that union political expenditures are
compelled speech and assumed in Citizens United that corporate politi-
cal expenditures are not, but the underlying issue-when is an entity
using a person's money to support political activities with which he or
she disagrees-is never considered in any depth.
Identifying compelled speech is harder than the Supreme Court
has acknowledged. For example, if officials of a state university ag-
gressively campaign for a ballot initiative for a tax increase which will
prevent drastic budget cuts, they are using money paid by students in
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tuition and fees.278 Is this compelled speech for those employees or
students who favor low taxes? If a large corporation lobbies for legisla-
tion on favorable tax treatment for corporations, is that compelled
speech for those employees or shareholders who favor higher corpo-
rate taxes to fund better social services or deficit reduction? In fact,
the complexity of the issue is reflected in the inconsistency in the
Court's decisions, as discussed in Part II, as to when expenditures of
money against the wishes of dissenters is compelled speech. In Board
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, the Court
unanimously upheld the permissibility of requiring college students to
pay money each semester to a fund that subsidizes student activities,
even though college students had to pay money for ideological activi-
ties they opposed. 279 In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Court rejected a claim
that requiring universities to allow military recruiters equal access to
campus interviewing as a condition for the receipt of federal funds
was impermissible compelled speech, even though costs were imposed
on law schools and they were forced to support implicitly an entity
with which they disagreed.280 Why is spending the money of dissent-
ers in these cases permissible while it is unconstitutional in Knox?
A second question is whether opt out is sufficient if there is com-
pelled speech. Again, the Court has been inconsistent. In Wooley v.
Maynard-a paradigm compelled speech case-the Court found opt
out sufficient; individuals could avoid the compelled speech problem
by placing tape over the offending words on the license plate.28' But
in Knox, the Court expressly found opt out to be insufficient.282 The
Court never has offered a principle as to when opt out is sufficient.
Even if it is accepted that there is compelled speech and that dis-
senters need protection, there is the distinct question of what is ade-
quate to meet the First Amendment. It is troubling in Knox that the
Court said that opt in, rather than opt out, is constitutionally required
but offered no analysis as to why opt out is not sufficient to protect
dissenters and satisfy the First Amendment. This is particularly dis-
turbing because the Court deviated from the approach that it had fol-
lowed for thirty-five years since Abood and does so with so little
explanation.
278 We note that the University of California did not campaign, aggressively or other-
wise, for a November 2012 ballot measure that prevented immediate budget cuts of hun-
dreds of million dollars because state law prohibits university officials from engaging in
such political activities in their official capacity. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 7054 (West Supp.
2013).
279 529 U.S. 217, 220-21 (2000). For further discussion, see supra text accompanying
notes 152-157.
280 547 U.S. 47, 51, 70 (2006). For further discussion, see supra text accompanying
notes 129-136.
281 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977)
282 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290-91 (2012).
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A third question is whether a law allowing compelled speech is
supported by a government interest sufficient to withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. Ultimately, the underlying issue is how the free
speech rights of the entity should be balanced against the rights of the
dissenting individuals. As explained above, in many cases-Citizens
United, Southworth, Dal-the Court emphasized the free speech rights
of the entity and its majority. In cases like Knox, the Court gave no
weight to the free speech rights of the entity and focused entirely on
the rights of the dissenters.
The inconsistency in how the Court balanced the First Amend-
ment rights of entities with those of dissenters and in the Court's as-
sessment of the government's interest in striking the balance more in
favor of one than the other has never been acknowledged by the
Court and has been largely overlooked by commentators.2 8 3 A crucial
underlying issue-and a central point of this Article-is the need to
focus directly on the competing interests of the entity to speak on
behalf of its majority and the rights of dissenters to be protected from
having their money spent against their wishes. Either the Court is ig-
noring this balance entirely or it is engaging in balancing without ever
acknowledging or explaining what it is doing.
Our hope is that separating these as distinct questions will lead to
greater clarity in analysis, cause courts and commentators to address
each of these questions in the depth they deserve, and result in less
inconsistency in the case law.
B. Corporations and Unions Should Be Treated the Same
Throughout this Article, we have repeatedly contrasted the differ-
ence in the treatment of corporations and unions as exemplified by
the difference in the decisions in Citizens United and Knox. In this sec-
tion, we go further and explain why, at the very least, corporations
and unions should be treated the same in terms of their speech rights
as entities and the rights of dissenting shareholders and members.
We make two points: First, in terms of democratic participation, there
is much more protection for dissenters in the union context than in
the corporate context, so if anything, the Court got it backwards in
these cases. Second, the difference between Citizens United and Knox
cannot be explained in terms of the presence or absence of state
action.
283 A few commentators have examined the problem. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson,
supra note 196, at 113-15 (noting that Citizens United left open the possibility of more
properly tailored mechanisms for protecting minority shareholders); Joseph Blocher,
Rights to and Not to, 100 CAuF. L. REv. 761, 795-96 (2012) (noting that the Court has not
"monogamously" remained committed to one speech categorization over another); Nat
Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 Buir. L. REv. 847, 851 (2011)
(describing rights against compelled speech).
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1. The Protections for Dissenters: Democracy in Corporations and
Unions
The constitutional jurisprudence on the expressive interests of as-
sociations generally overlooks how allowing some in the organization
to use its resources to advance their views coerces others within the
organization. And it entirely lacks any theory of what kinds of internal
governance mechanisms within the organization would be necessary
or appropriate to ensure a fair allocation of speech protections be-
tween those who wish the organization to promote one message and
those who wish it to promote another. Apart from unsubstantiated
and conclusory gestures to the idea that shareholders can protect
themselves through the procedures of corporate democracy, the Su-
preme Court has mainly concluded that because corporations and as-
sociations like the Boy Scouts are private entities, their disregard of
the dissenters' views involves no state action and, therefore, the rights
of the dissenters are irrelevant to the First Amendment rights of the
entity.28 4
Ironically, however, the Court's robust protection for the rights
of union dissenters gives the one group that already enjoys substantial
legal power to control the activities and expenditures of their organi-
zation far more constitutional protection than is enjoyed by any other
member or constituent of a for-profit or nonprofit corporation or as-
sociation. Thus, to the extent that Knox and its predecessors are based
on a fear that unions will use their own First Amendment rights to
coerce dissenting minorities within the organization, the Court has
granted protection to those that already enjoy it. Meanwhile, dissent-
ing minorities within corporations enjoy very little legal protection ei-
ther to shape the agenda of their organization or to opt out of
expenditures that would constitute compelled speech.
Federal law extensively regulates the internal affairs of unions.
Early common law doctrines that treated the union's legal status as a
contract with its members, along with the smattering of state laws reg-
ulating nonprofit associations generally, seemed to critics inadequate
to the task of regulating entities that had the economic and political
power and social importance that unions had in the 1950s. 285 Moreo-
ver, corruption in the large and powerful Teamsters Union invited
congressional action. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin
Act,2 86 comprehensively regulates internal union affairs by protecting
284 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 643-44 (2000).
285 See Bor & Datz, supra note 25, at 426.
286 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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the rights of union members to participate in the governance of the
union and to enable the United States Department of Labor to in-
spect the finances of unions. 287
Title I contains what the statute calls a "bill of rights" for union
members.288 It grants rights to equal treatment, to free speech and
assembly, to run for union office, to approve dues increases through
direct votes or delegate conventions, to sue the union, to due process
in disciplinary proceedings, to obtain a copy of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, to be informed by the union about rights under the
LMRDA, and to freedom from retaliation by the union for attempting
to exercise rights under the LMRDA.28 9 Other titles of the LMRDA
impose reporting requirements on unions and their officers, 290 regu-
late the process by which unions may replace the leadership of
subordinate entities within the union, such as local affiliates,291 and
regulate the timing and conduct of elections of union leadership. 292
Unions may enforce only "reasonable qualifications uniformly im-
posed" on eligibility to run for office. 2 9 3 Finally, the LMRDA imposes
fiduciary duties on union officials.29 4 It grants general investigative
287 See William W. Osborne, Union Member Rights & Obligations, in LABOR UNION LAW
AND REGULATION, supra note 25, at 7. As one scholar noted, the LMRDA attempts "to draw
a fine line between the need to protect internal union democracy and the desire to avoid
undue government interference in internal union affairs." MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 33 (1988). As pointed out previously, the LMRDA does not
confer rights on nonmembers, nor does it regulate the rights of employees represented by
unions that do not represent private sector workers. The internal governance of unions
that represent only employees of state and local government may be regulated by state
laws.
288 LMRDA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (2006).
289 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 431, 481, 529, 530. In Sheet Metal Workers'InternationalAss'n
v. Lynn, a leading case interpreting the Title I protections, the Supreme Court held that an
elected union official could not be removed in retaliation for expressing views critical of a
proposed dues increase. See 488 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1989).
290 LMRDA §§ 201-203, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-433.
291 LMRDA §§ 301-303, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-463.
292 29 U.S.C. § 481.
293 29 U.S.C. §481(e); see Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S.
305, 306-07 (1977) (invalidating union rule limiting eligibility for election to union office
to those who had attended at least one-half of monthly union meetings because it ren-
dered vast majority of members ineligible and was not justified by desire to ensure that
those elected to office were dedicated and knowledgeable about union governance); Her-
man v. Springfield Mass. Area, Local 497, Am. Postal Workers Union, 201 F.3d 1, 2, 6 (1st
Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable a rule requiring attendance at three monthly meetings in
twelve months even though it disqualified 96% of membership); Herman v. Local 1011,
United Steelworkers, 207 F.3d 924, 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding unreasonable an eligi-
bility rule requiring attendance at eight monthly meetings in two years when it disqualified
92% of union's 3000 members.
294 LMRDA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501.
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power to the Secretary of Labor and prohibits retaliation against those
who exercise their rights under the act.2 95
In contrast to the extensive federal regulation of union govern-
ance and dues collection under the LMRDA, the law of corporations
gives shareholders relatively little power to control the decision mak-
ing or disclosures of corporations and absolutely no power over its
political speech. More than forty years ago, Victor Brudney raised se-
rious questions about whether political spending by corporations
might violate the First Amendment rights of shareholders and called
for the creation of law regulating how corporations decide whether to
engage in political speech. 296 As scholars have recently observed, his
call has not been answered. In the wake of Citizens United, Professors
Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson, Jr. renewed the call for law to
determine how corporations exercise their newly expanded First
Amendment rights. As they observed,
[u]nder existing corporate law rules, political speech decisions
are by default governed by the same rules as ordinary business deci-
sions. As a result, with respect to corporate political speech deci-
sions, there is under current corporate law (i) no role for
shareholders; (ii) no mandatory role for independent directors;
and (iii) no mandatory disclosure to investors.297
Shareholders have no legal rights to disclosure of corporate political
expenditures and no legal rights to vote on the amount or recipients
of corporate political expenditures. 2 9 8
If we take the Court at its word that shareholders are not coerced
by corporate political speech because they have the mechanisms of
corporate democracy available to protect them, it follows that the
rights of dissenters should be sensitive to the degree of legal protec-
tion they have to control or influence internal organizational govern-
ance. On this analysis, dissenting union members should have fewer
rights to opt out (or opt in) than do shareholders. Unlike corpora-
tions, unions are obliged by federal law and by their own constitutions
and bylaws to disclose their expenditures to their members and to po-
litical bodies, to allow members to vote on dues increases, to allow
members to vote on whether to ratify a union contract (including its
agency fee or union security clause), and to allow members to attend
295 LMRDA §§ 601, 609, 29 U.S.C. §§ 521, 529 (2006). The LMRDA is enforced by
litigation brought by private individuals as well as by investigations and litigation brought
by the United States Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 440, 464. In addition, the Depart-
ment of Labor has promulgated regulations interpreting and enforcing the statute. See,
e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 401, (2012).
296 Brudney, supra note 196, at 235-43.
297 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 196, at 87.
298 Id.; see Brudney, supra note 196, at 237.
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and speak at union meetings and to run for office.29 9 Of course, the
existence of majoritarian, democratic legal processes do not obviate
the need to protect minorities in union governance any more than in
political governance. Surely that unions are compelled by law to run
as democracies and to respect the free speech rights of minorities,
while corporations are not, is reason to suggest that employees should
not have greater dissenters' rights than shareholders.
2. State Action
One argument for treating corporations and unions differently is
based on state action. The argument is that the state requires nonun-
ion members to pay agency fees and thus the First Amendment ap-
plies in the union context, whereas the state does not require anyone
to be a shareholder, and the First Amendment therefore does not ap-
ply when a corporation spends shareholder money in election cam-
paigns. On close examination, however, it is apparent that this
argument overstates the role of the government with regard to unions
and understates it with regard to corporations. The result is that the
difference between the treatment of corporations and unions ulti-
mately cannot justified based on the presence or absence of state
action.3 0 0
To be clear, neither federal nor state law requires that anyone
pay agency fees; no statute requires that nonmembers of a union pay
funds to support the collective bargaining activity of a union. Agency
fees are collected only if a majority of employees vote to unionize, and
only then if the union and the employer agree to a contract requiring
the payment of fees.301 Absent this private action, there is no union
and no fees are collected for it. Federal and state laws play an impor-
tant, but a more subtle, role. Laws specify the procedures through
which employees decide to unionize, and they do not prohibit the
union from requesting that individuals who do not pay the agency
fees be fired or the employer from firing those individuals. 3 0 2 Thus, a
combination of both private action and government action is involved
when a union collects agency fees.
The same is also true when a corporation spends money on politi-
cal activities. The choice of a corporation to expend corporate funds
in an election is a private decision made by the officers and ultimately
299 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 431, 481, 529-530.
300 The question of whether union security provisions involve greater state action than
do corporate charters granting officers control over corporate political speech and the
conclusion that the degree of state action is equivalent except in the case of government
employers are extensively discussed in Sachs, supra note 4, at 844-51. We only briefly cover
the main points here and refer readers to his longer discussion.
301 See Bor & Datz, supra note 25, at 424-25.
302 See id. at 428-32.
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the directors of the corporation, but it is state law which allows this to
occur without shareholder consent. State corporate law, specifically
the business judgment rule, gives to corporate officers and directors
broad latitude to spend corporate funds in the best interests of the
corporation.3 0 3 It is the corporate law of the states, both in statutes
and in common law, that creates corporations as entities, facilitates
investment in them under the terms of limited liability stipulated by
state corporate law, and allows corporations to spend money without
express shareholder consent. This law is unquestionably state
action.304
Therefore, for both private sector unions and corporations, there
are both private actions and government actions that are critically in-
volved when money is spent in election campaigns. With respect to
public sector unions, of course, there is state action: the government
as the employer is empowered through its negotiations with the pri-
vate, nonprofit organization representing its employees to agree to a
contract requiring employees to pay agency fees. As noted above, the
discontinuity in the Court's treatment of public sector agency fees is
not on the issue of state action, but on the substance of the First
Amendment. Under Abood, government employees have a First
Amendment right to refuse to support union political speech.30 5 But
under cases upholding the Hatch Act and equivalent restrictions on
government employee political activity and under Garcetti, govern-
ment employees have few or no First Amendment rights to engage in
any political speech except their Abood rights to oppose unions.306
C. How Should Corporations and Unions Be Treated?
Thus far in this Part, we have made two relatively modest argu-
ments: a clearer analytical framework is needed and, under it, corpo-
rations and unions should be treated the same. But this, of course,
does not address how they should be treated. Put most simply, the
question is whether to extend the treatment of corporations in Citizens
United to unions or the treatment of unions in Abood to corporations.
In other words, should there be more protection for dissenting corpo-
rate shareholders, as Abood's approach would provide, or should there
303 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 196, at 87; Sachs, supra note 4, at 824-25.
304 Long ago, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964), the Court
recognized that the common law of a state is state action. ("It matters not that . .. it is
common law only.... The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.").
305 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977).
306 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-26 (2006); United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554-56 (1973) (upholding the
Hatch Act, which restricts federal employees from engaging in certain political activities).
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be more protection for the expressive interests of unions, as Citizens
United would provide?
In subpart A, we identified three key questions which should be
applied in analyzing when entity expenditure of funds should be seen
as violating the free speech rights of dissenters. Applying these ques-
tions here, we conclude that the Citizens United approach is preferable
and that unions should be able to spend funds on political activities
without needing to let dissenting members opt out.
To be clear, in saying this, we are not addressing a different ques-
tion that is beyond the scope of this paper: Is there a compelling gov-
ernment interest in limiting corporate and union expenditures in
political campaigns because of the potentially distorting effects of
such spending? This, of course, was the key dispute between the ma-
jority and dissenters in Citizens United.307 Our analysis focuses on dif-
ferent questions: Are restrictions on corporate and union
expenditures justified to protect dissenters, and if there is a basis for
First Amendment protection for dissenters, what is sufficient to ac-
complish it?
First, political spending by an organization should not be re-
garded as compelled speech by dissenters-whether they are share-
holders or union members or dissidents within an organization-even
if they are providing funds to support the organization and its activi-
ties. When the entity speaks, it is expressing the entity's views as di-
rected by those controlling it; dissenters are not being forced to
convey any message. Indeed, as Justice Frankfurter recognized long
ago in his opinion in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, when the
union spends money, "[n]o one's desire or power to speak his mind is
checked or curbed. The individual member may express his views in
any public or private forum as freely as he could before the union
collected his dues."308
This is not a novel idea. In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Court said that
the First Amendment rights of law schools were not infringed by forc-
ing them to allow the military to recruit on campus, even though this
involved the compelled expenditure of funds, because "[1] aw schools
remain free under the statute to express whatever views they may have
307 Compare 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) ("[W]e now conclude that independent expend-
itures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption."), with id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our lawmakers have a
compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to
guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and na-
tional races.").
308 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 806 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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on the military's congressionally mandated employment policy, all the
while retaining eligibility for federal funds."309
If a corporation or union were to require its shareholders or
members to campaign or display bumper stickers or engage in parti-
san activities for a specific candidate, that would be compelled speech.
But so long as it is the entity expressing its views, with dissidents com-
pletely free to say whatever they want however they want, the use of
entity money that originates with stakeholders should not be regarded
as compelled speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.310
Second, even if there is compelled speech, the question is what
remedy is appropriate. Citizens United requires none (because it does
not recognize the compelled speech problem) while Abood requires
that opt out be available for political expenditures and Knox requires
opt in for special assessments. As explained above, one approach
would be to extend Abood and Knox to corporate spending. At the
very least, opt out is sufficient to protect the interests of dissenters; any
who do not want their money spent in a particular way have the mech-
anism to ensure that this does not occur.
We think, though, that the better approach would be to apply
Citizens United to the union context and eliminate both opt-out and
opt-in requirements and allow spending without any legal protection
for dissenters. Both Abood and Knox require a determination of what
expenditures are "germane" to the union's collective bargaining activ-
ities and which are not. As explained above, courts have struggled
with this distinction and have been markedly inconsistent.311
This is inevitable because it involves difficult line drawing. Of
course, that a line is difficult to draw does not mean one cannot be
drawn. But courts should hesitate to adopt such rules. If a union is
lobbying city council members to approve a new collective bargaining
agreement with city workers, is that not clearly germane to the union's
collective bargaining activities? Imagine that approval of the new col-
lective bargaining agreement with city workers turns on the outcome
of a city council race. If the union expends funds to elect the candi-
date who has pledged to approve the new collective bargaining activ-
ity, is this not clearly germane to the union's collective bargaining
activities? Imagine that a presidential race will unquestionably deter-
mine the members of the National Labor Relations Board and that
will directly affect the rights of employees and the power they have to
309 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).
310 Consider whether, at some point, compelling people to fund the speech of an en-
tity might violate the First Amendment because of the onerousness of the levy, but not
because it constitutes speech of the person. For example, an entity's charging of 50% of
an employee's paycheck to pay for billboards for political candidates might violate the First
Amendment solely because of the burden of the charge.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 247-251.
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negotiate and enforce collective bargaining agreements across the
country. Is that not clearly related to the collective bargaining of the
union? Yet, under current law, courts are likely to deem each scenario
not germane and beyond the unions' ability to spend money without
allowing nonmembers to opt out (or under Knox, if it is a special as-
sessment, to opt in).3 12
The underlying assumption of Abood and Beck is that there is a
distinction between what is germane to collective bargaining and what
is political. The difference is a matter of degree rather than of kind.
In fact, unless the union is being irresponsible and its leadership is
violating its statutorily imposed fiduciary duties, everything the union
spends is to further the interests of the union, its members, and the
employees it represents. 313 Everything it does therefore will be "ger-
mane." The same is true of corporations. If a corporation lobbies the
government for regulations that expand its markets (perhaps by per-
mitting vending machines in public schools) or reduce its operating
costs (by relaxing environmental regulation or labor protections) or
create tax breaks from local governments (that will reduce revenues
available to fund public schools), its political speech may be germane
to its business but offensive to some of its shareholders. Corporate
officers may believe that nothing is more important to the corpora-
tion's business climate than the winner of the state gubernatorial elec-
tion or the federal presidential election. Drawing the line between
speech that is germane and that which is not would be as difficult for
corporations as for unions, but the challenge of implementing any
rule with respect to corporations would be larger because there are
more corporations with more shareholders than there are unions.
Notifying shareholders of opt-out or opt-in rights would be a corre-
spondingly larger task. Administering an objection system would be
complex, particularly for shareholders whose stocks are managed by a
pension or mutual fund. Sending out rebate checks as dividends, as
some scholars have proposed, would not be a simple task.3 14 Moreo-
ver, if the Knox distinction between ordinary dues and special assess-
ments holds, a set of rules would be necessary to determine which
corporate political expenditures are ordinary and which are special in
order to determine which expenditures shareholders would opt out of
and which they would opt into. In sum, although conceptually it
makes sense to apply to corporations the same opt-out or opt-in rights
that are applied to unions, the implementation of such a system would
not be simple or cheap.
312 See Sachs, supra note 4, at 816-17.
313 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
314 See, e.g., Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People's Money: Reconciling Citizens United with
Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (2010).
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Finally, even if corporate and union spending is seen as com-
pelled speech for dissidents, there is a sufficiently important interest
for allowing it. Free speech rights are, of course, not absolute. The
Supreme Court repeatedly has said that content-based restrictions on
free speech must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral restric-
tions only need to meet intermediate scrutiny.3 15
Allowing corporations, unions, and other entities to spend money
over the objection of dissenters is a content-neutral rule. It allows or-
ganizations to do this whatever the topic of the expression and
whatever the viewpoint of the speech. Therefore, by definition, this is
a content-neutral rule.3 16 As such, it only has to meet intermediate
scrutiny; that is, it must be substantially related to an important gov-
ernment interest.
Allowing entities to engage in speech serves important interests.
As the Supreme Court recognized in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellottian7 and more recently in Citizens United, speech of corporations
is protected because it adds to the marketplace of ideas and helps to
inform people. That, of course, is true of the speech of unions and all
organizations. As the Court explained in Bellotti, "[tjhe inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual." 3 18 Similarly, in Citizens United, the
Court stressed that the value of speech does not depend on the iden-
tity of the speaker and that restrictions on corporate speech deprive
society of ideas and information. The Court said that the law limiting
corporate expenditures in election campaigns
muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant seg-
ments of the economy. And the electorate [has been] deprived of
information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function. By sup-
pressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and
nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints
from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or
entities are hostile to their interests.319
315 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("Our
precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvan-
tage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. ... In contrast,
regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level
of scrutiny . . . .").
316 See id. at 643 ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based. By
contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the
ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral." (citations omitted)).
Here, no distinction is made based on the viewpoint expressed.
317 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
318 Id. at 777.




Thus, permitting entities-such as corporations and unions and
other organizations-to take positions and speak on political issues
facilitates what the Supreme Court has deemed to be an important,
and indeed a compelling, interest: informing the electorate.
Also, allowing entities to speak serves the important interest that
is also benefitted by protecting freedom of association: facilitating the
speech of the majority who control the entity. The Supreme Court
explained that " [e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points
of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association." 3 20 Groups have resources-in human capital and
money-that a single person lacks. The Court has observed that "[a]n
individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the govern-
ment for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage
in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 3 21
Allowing an entity to speak is really allowing the majority who
control it to express their message much more effectively than they
could as separate individuals. This, too, is a reason for allowing enti-
ties to speak, even though dissenters may disagree with their message.
In fact, in Southworth, the Court unanimously upheld the permis-
sibility of requiring college students to pay money each semester to a
fund that subsidizes student activities, even though the university
spent funds in ways that some students objected to, because it was
viewpoint neutral and because there was the important interest of fa-
cilitating speech.322 In other words, the speech interests of the entity
were deemed to outweigh the interests of the dissenting students who
objected to how their money was being spent. We believe this same
rationale should be followed for unions, corporations, and other
entities.323
We are not unmindful of the fact that a dissident employee or
shareholder or student or organization member may dislike how
320 NAACP v. Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
321 Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). For an excellent discus-
sion of the rights of groups under the Constitution, see generally Ronald R. Garet, Commu-
nality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983).
322 529 U.S. 217, 229-30 (2000).
323 We limit our argument to an entity's actual speech and expenditures for political
speech. We believe that expressive conduct, including discrimination in membership as in
Dale or arguably expressive conduct such as that involved in offering an employee benefits
plan that omits coverage of contraceptives and family planning services presents a different
balance between the First Amendment rights of the entity and the equality rights of the
dissenters. See supra note 3. We have discussed that issue elsewhere. See Erwin Chemerin-
sky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interests of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 595,
596 (2001) (arguing that the framework of Dale "is flawed in that it fails to consider
whether there is a compelling interest in infringing expressive association so as to achieve
equality").
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money is being spent. But for the reasons given in this subpart, we
believe that the burden on the dissident is minimal and the benefits of
allowing speech by the entity are great. The result we propose is not
radical; it is simply applying to unions exactly what the Supreme Court
approved for corporations in cases like Citizens United. The govern-
ment interests in allowing unions to engage in political speech are at
least as great as in allowing corporations to do so, and the government
interests in allowing dissenting employees, or state bar members or
mushroom growers, to opt out are no greater than in allowing share-
holders to do so.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local
1000 may seem like a relatively minor case. The Supreme Court said
that nonmembers needed to opt into supporting the union's special
assessment opposing ballot initiatives. In this Article, we have at-
tempted to show that Knox is anything but minor. It has potentially
broad implications for the political activities of unions and even for
the future of exclusive representation in collective bargaining based
on majority rule.
Knox also raises even more expansive questions about the speech
rights of entities-including corporations, nonprofit associations, and
unions-compared with the speech rights of dissenting shareholders
and members. This is an issue that arises in countless important con-
texts but has not been dealt with by the Supreme Court in a consistent
or even a coherent manner.
In this Article, we have suggested an approach to dealing with
this issue and for resolving the inconsistency that is so manifestly evi-
dent in cases like Citizens United and Knox. Corporations and unions
must be treated the same and both should have the ability to speak.
In our view, contrary to that of most commentators, neither corporate
political speech nor union political speech involves compelled speech
of dissenting stakeholders, and therefore neither employees nor stock-
holders should be required by law to opt in or given a legal right to
opt out. Thus, we argue that the reasoning of Citizens United compels
the Court to reconsider Street, Abood, and the cases that depend on
them, including Knox. Whatever position the Court takes, it should
treat unions and corporations the same. First Amendment law must
be more than that the five Justices in the majority-and it was the
same five Justices who were the majority in both cases-want to pro-
tect corporations' speech rights more than they want to protect un-
ions' speech rights or that they care more about protecting the speech
rights of anti-union employees than they do about the rights of dissi-
dent shareholders.
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